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BUILDING A LIFELINE: 
A PROPOSED GLOBAL PLATFORM 
AND RESPONSIBILITY SHARING MODEL 
FOR THE GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES 
SARNATA REYNOLDS & JUAN PABLO VACATELLO* 
ABSTRACT 
In 2016, the leaders of 193 governments committed to more equitable 
and predictable sharing of responsibility for refugees as part of the New 
York Declaration, to be realized in the Global Compact on Refugees.  To 
encourage debate, this paper presents the first global model to measure 
the capacity of governments to physically protect and financially support 
refugees and host communities.  The model is based on a new database 
of indicators covering 193 countries, which assigns a fair share to each 
country and measures current government contributions to the protection 
of refugees.  The model also proposes a new government-led global 
platform in support of refugee protection and human development. 
In January 2019, an overwhelming majority of U.N. Member States 
adopted a resolution affirming the Global Compact on Refugees.  This 
pact of international solidarity and cooperation is more important today 
than ever—as powerful countries double-down on xenophobia, promote 
 
* Sarnata Reynolds serves as the Director of Policy at The Immigration Hub.  She has over 
fifteen years of experience conducting research and analysis, teaching, and developing national and 
international policy and advocacy strategies in support of those displaced and migrating around the 
world.  Juan Pablo Vacatello is the Director of Finance at Mi Casa, Inc., and has more than fifteen 
years of experience designing financial models and developing and advocating for public policies 
that benefit low-income and immigrant communities.  Sarnata and Juan Pablo would like to thank 
their spouses and children, Andrés, Jenny, Brighida, Tadhg, Benji, and Alex for putting up without 
us on too many evenings and weekends.  We could not have settled on a final approach and 
methodology for this model without refugee friends and professional supporters, who shared with 
us their patience and expertise as we struggled to finalize the model.  The contents and methodology 
of this paper were developed by the authors outside of their respective professional roles, and as 
such, the ideas put forward do not represent and should not be attributed to any individuals or 
entities, except the authors.   
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toxic politics, and drastically narrow their contributions to refugee 
protection.  While the Refugee Compact has the potential to provide 
better protection and care for refugee and host communities, it is not 
legally binding.  Its promises may only be realized through the adoption 
of a concrete model for equitable and predictable responsibility sharing 
based on each nation’s capacity to receive and/or care for refugees.  The 
responsibility sharing model presented here is put forward to challenge 
policymakers and help shape discussions toward an agreed upon 
approach to determining each nation’s capacity based on a data-driven 
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INTRODUCTION 
A. Refugee Protection and the Role of Civil Society and Governments 
Over and over again, through conflicts and across decades, ordinary 
people, mayors and mukhtars, families and organizations, have taken on 
the responsibility to welcome and protect refugees.  Almost seventy years 
after the passage of the 1951 U.N. Refugee Convention,1 governments 
generally accept that people fleeing conflict and persecution have the 
right to seek protection in another country,2 and countries neighboring 
those in conflict have protected tens of millions of refugees for protracted 
periods of time.3   
Over the past forty years, millions of women, men, and children from 
dozens of countries have been resettled elsewhere.4  States have also 
contributed billions of dollars in support to refugees and their host 
countries, but with an unprecedented twenty-six million refugees in the 
world today, both the needs and the contributions are increasing.  Every 
single refugee who receives protection and care is a testament to our best 
intentions in action, when we work together and share responsibility for 
the rights that each of us enjoys. 
 
1. The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) was created 
after the Second World War to address the issue of the large numbers of displaced persons in 
Europe.  In 1967, an Additional Protocol was adopted to expand the scope of protection to the entire 
world.  There are 145 state parties to the two documents.  U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 
the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, 2-3, U.N. Doc. COM&PI/C.1·CONV&PRO (Dec. 2010), http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/3b66c2aa10.pdf#zoom=95 [https://perma.cc/544E-HTXG]. 
2. This does not mean that some countries do not attempt to avoid their responsibilities.  
Indeed, the fact that some actively attempt to justify pushbacks, refoulement, and mass deportations 
as exceptions in specific circumstances demonstrates the general acceptance of refugee rights to 
access other countries and receive protection. 
3. As the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, noted in early 2017, “most 
refugees stay in the countries neighboring their war-torn homelands.”  For instance, since the 
beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2001 thousands of Syrians have been accommodated in Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Iraq.  Only recently, Bangladesh has accepted over 600,000 refugees fleeing over its 
border with Myanmar.  Nor is the protection of neighboring countries a new phenomenon: Tanzania 
and Uganda, for instance, still provide protection to people who fled conflict in their neighboring 
home countries in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1990s.  Poorer Countries Host Most of the Forcibly 
Displaced, Report Shows, UNHCR (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2017/2/ 
58b001ab4/poorer-countries-host-forcibly-displaced-report-shows.html [https://perma.cc/S69Z-
ZQVQ]. 
4. Resettlement Data Finder, UNHCR, https://rsq.unhcr.org/en/#l6HV. 
5
Reynolds and Vacatello: Responsibility Sharing Model for the Global Compact on Refugees
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
330 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 21:325 
In Lesbos, the refugee crisis caught us by surprise.  Numbers were 
overwhelming and we were unprepared.  But despite the economic crisis 
that is still affecting our families, we knew we had a moral duty to open 
our doors, at least locally, in a time when countries were closing their 
borders.  We knew that we could be in their shoes at any time, and therefore 
we tried to treat them as we would like to be treated if we ourselves were 
refugees. 
—Spyros Galinos, Mayor of Lesbos, Greece5 
However, we know that there is also a darker side to many societies, 
driven by toxic politics and nativist, racist, and/or xenophobic sentiments.  
In contrast to the energy and goodwill local communities have dedicated 
to rallying around refugees, we have also seen governments reject or 
attempt to avoid their responsibilities.  Over the past two decades, both 
the U.S. and the EU have erected physical and bureaucratic barriers to 
drastically limit the ability of refugees and others seeking protection to 
reach or cross their borders, resulting in thousands of deaths in the 
Mediterranean Sea and along the U.S.–Mexico desert border.6  After 
decades of hosting more than one million Afghan refugees, in 2016, 
Pakistan forcibly deported hundreds of thousands of them back to 
Afghanistan.7  And in 2015, Rohingya refugees were stranded for weeks 
 
5. Speaking to Elena Sánchez-Montijano of the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs 
(CIDOB) in 2016.  Meeting at CIDOB with Spyros Galinos, Lesbos’ Major, CIDOB (Mar. 16, 
2016), https://www.cidob.org/en/news/issues/migrations/meeting_at_cidob_with_spyros_galinos_ 
lesbos_major [https://perma.cc/H2UG-LRN4]. 
6. Under the Trump Administration, the United States is in a downward spiral, with the 
administration withdrawing from multilateral agreements, blatantly violating human rights, and 
dehumanizing migrants and refugees.  In 2019, the administration introduced a variety of measures 
aimed at shutting down the southern border to asylum seekers.  While these efforts have been 
enjoined by U.S. federal courts on many occasions, the cumulative effect has been devastating to 
both the refugee and asylum programs, and they will likely take years to recover.  See, e.g., HUMAN 
RIGHTS FIRST, DELIVERED TO DANGER: ILLEGAL REMAIN IN MEXICO POLICY IMPERILS ASYLUM 
SEEKERS’ LIVES AND DENIES DUE PROCESS (Aug. 2019), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/ 
sites/default/files/Delivered-to-Danger-August-2019%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FZ5-3B77].  See 
generally AMNESTY INT’L, IN HOSTILE TERRAIN: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT IN THE US SOUTHWEST (2012), https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/ai_inhostile 
terrain_final031412.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6E4-9EW5]; RAPHAEL SHILAV, OXFAM, BEYOND 
‘FORTRESS EUROPE’: PRINCIPLES FOR A HUMANE EU MIGRATION POLICY (2017), 
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp-principles-humane-eu-mi 
gration-policy-111017-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/EC6W-8WX4].  This outlines some of the costs of 
European migration policies that aim to prevent people from arriving irregularly in Europe.   
7. See Pakistan Coercion, UN Complicity: The Mass Forced Return of Afghan Refugees, 
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/02/13/pakistan-coercion-un-
6
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on Asia’s Andaman Sea because no country in the region would allow 
them to dock—it was local fishermen who ultimately rescued many of 
them.8  
And yet this has also been a time of real leadership.  Turkey’s mission 
representative to the U.N., HE Ali Naci Koru, stated in 2017, “The 
situation on the ground requires a mentality shift within the international 
community.  We definitely need a comprehensive approach to support 
refugees and host countries and to deliver durable solutions.”  He 
continued, “Equitable and meaningful burden and responsibility sharing 
is necessary.”9  Over the last two years, Colombia and other countries 
neighboring Venezuela have received and protected more than three 
million refugees and migrants seeking protection and refuge from 
persecution, violence, and poverty.10  This is even more impressive given 
that Colombia remains in transition to peace after a decades-long civil 
war, and millions of its own citizens remain displaced both inside and 
outside the country. 
More of this kind of measured and specific political and pragmatic 
leadership, which both acknowledges challenges and aims to tackle them, 
is sorely needed from leaders around the world.  And we can do this.  
Indeed, despite incredible odds, in April 2016, representatives of 160 
countries came together to agree on the terms of the Paris Agreement on 
climate change.11  Although the agreement was expected to take years to 
 
complicity/mass-forced-return-afghan-refugees [https://perma.cc/2UWU-97E7] (detailing the 
“mass refoulement” of Afghan refugees). 
8. UNHCR, SOUTH-EAST ASIA: MIXED MARITIME MOVEMENTS 4 (April–June 2015), 
https://www.unhcr.org/53f1c5fc9.pdf [https://perma.cc/FD4S-TGWN]. 
9. Statement of Turkey to the First Thematic Discussion: “Past and Current Burden  
and Responsibility Sharing Arrangements, GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES (July 10, 2017),  
http://www.unhcr.org/59885f777.pdf [https://perma.cc/4H4G-95DE] (statement of His Excellency 
Mr. Ali Naci Koru, Turkey Mission). 
10. UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED MIGRATION IN 2018, at 24 (2019), 
https://www.unhcr.org/5d08d7ee7.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LYS-QK7L].  
11. The Paris Agreement, an agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), provides that each party will make commitments to take steps to 
keep rises in global temperature to below 2ºC above pre-industrial levels.  Somewhat unexpectedly, 
states agreed to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further, to 1.5ºC.  As of 
November 2017, 195 UNFCCC members had signed the agreement, and 170 had become party to 
it.  See generally U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Apr. 22-Dec. 8, 2016, 7 
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come into effect as it needed fifty-five ratifications, in fact this occurred 
in less than two years.  And while turning aspiration into action continues 
to be an uphill struggle, there is now a global consensus on the problems 
caused by climate change and an agreed roadmap for addressing them.12 
In a similar way, refugee crises are not inevitable and governments are 
not powerless when faced with them.  Our research demonstrates that a 
number of governments around the world, including those of Turkey, 
Uganda, Jordan, Colombia, and Germany, consistently exhibited 
composure and generosity when faced with the arrival of large numbers 
of refugees—although initial responses do not necessarily continue 
indefinitely.  In a matter of a few weeks between August and October 
2017, Bangladesh received and protected more than 600,000 Rohingya 
refugees running from Myanmar’s genocide campaign.13  Many other 
governments, however, including those of Australia, the United States, 
and the European Union, are failing to provide their fair share of physical 
protection and financial support to refugees and their host countries.  
These states, among so many others, have the capacity and resources to 
do much better, and they have no credible justification for doing so 
terribly. 
B. An Unprecedented Opportunity: The Global Compact on Refugees 
Crisis after crisis, conference after conference, it seems inaction is the only 
thing that the international community can agree on . . . .  Let us hope that 
today’s conference will be different, and that the international community 
 
12. No doubt the Trump Administration’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement 
was a setback, and yet quickly thereafter, dozens of U.S. governors, mayors, and other local 
authorities committed to reducing greenhouse gases even if the federal government would not.  It 
is these bright spots, among many other attacks on progress, that demonstrate the will and ability 
of people and their governments to collectively do better.  Rebecca Hersher, Mayors and Governors 
Rebut Trump Administration Position at Climate Summit, NPR (Dec. 12, 2018, 10:50 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/12/12/676001283/mayors-and-governors-rebut-trump-administration-
position-at-climate-summit [https://perma.cc/4RCR-9WBB]. 
13. Situation Report: Rohingya Refugee Crisis, HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE: INTER  
SECTOR COORDINATION GROUP, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarian 
response.info/files/documents/files/171105_weekly_iscg_sitrep_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/K389-
WYTB] (finding per the International Organization for Migration Needs and Population 
Monitoring, as of November 5, 2017, roughly 609,000 new arrivals had been reported in 
Bangladesh since August 25, 2017, adding to more than 200,000 Rohingya refugees already in the 
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is going to share responsibility for refugees . . . .  Our message to you, 
world leaders: in our small way refugees are already taking the action, we 
want world leaders to do the same. 
—Mohammed Badran, Syrian Volunteers Netherlands (SYVNL), Syrian 
youth representative to the U.N. Summit for Refugees and Migrants, 
September 19, 2016 
In 2016, U.N. Member States agreed that the protection of refugees 
was a shared international responsibility that must be borne more 
equitably and in a more predictable manner.14  Among other outcomes, 
this led to the adoption of the New York Declaration for Refugees and 
Migrants, which achieved consensus from 193 governments.15  The 
Declaration marks the first time that the U.N. General Assembly 
expressed a collective commitment to sharing responsibility for refugees, 
regardless of where they live and regardless of whether a nation was a 
signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention.  
To address the needs of refugees and receiving States, we commit to a more 
equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and 
supporting the world’s refugees, while taking account of existing 
contributions and the differing capacities and resources among States. 
—Paragraph 68, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, 
United Nations, September 19, 201616 
And as previously noted, at the United Nations General Assembly in 
January 2018, all 193 U.N. member states, except the United States and 
Hungary, adopted a resolution including the Compact.  While this global 
approach to a global challenge may seem impossible to imagine less than 
three years later, in reality, some of our greatest collective achievements 
 
14. UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants 2016, U.N. REFUGEES & MIGRANTS, 
https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/summit [https://perma.cc/D7SV-LA2E]. 
15. At the U.N. Summit on Refugees and Migrants, hosted by the U.N. General Assembly 
in New York on September 19, 2016, the New York Declaration was unanimously adopted by all 
193 Member States (Resolution 71/1).  It was a milestone in that 193 governments reached 
consensus on global solidarity and refugee protection at a time of unprecedented displacement (yet, 
migration overall has held steady at about three percent of the world’s population over decades, 
despite what might be suggested by recent media attention).  The Declaration is intended to improve  
the way in which the international community responds to large movements of refugees and 
migrants, including protracted refugee situations.  G.A. Res. A/71/L.1, at 1/25 (Sept. 13, 2016); 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/L.1. 
16. G.A. Res. A/71/L.1, at ¶ 68 (Sept. 13, 2016). 
9
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have been birthed out of our darkest moments, including the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1951 Refugee and 
Statelessness Conventions—all coming into effect less than ten years 
after World War II.   
Indeed, asserting the need for a standing mechanism for responsibility 
sharing that is both predictable and equitable is certainly not a new idea.  
The 1951 Refugee Convention specifically raised the necessity of 
international cooperation when it stated that: 
[T]he grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain 
countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United 
Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore 
be achieved without international co-operation.17 
This statement, contained in the preamble of the Convention, 
recognizes that: 1) there is a responsibility to protect refugees and asylum 
seekers; 2) this may place a disproportionate burden on states hosting 
large numbers of refugees; and 3) states should share responsibility and 
alleviate the challenges of hosting refugees through international 
cooperation.  However, despite this clear directive stated in the 1951 
Refugee Convention itself, developing a concrete mechanism for 
responsibility sharing has proven very difficult over the years. 
That the world continues to react to refugee rights and needs in an ad 
hoc manner is not due to a lack of opportunity,18 or to a lack of positive 
regional responses,19 or pressure from non-government organizations 
 
17. U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons,  
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 13, U.N. Doc. COM&PI/ 
C.1·CONV&PRO (Dec. 2010), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10.pdf#zoom=95 
[https://perma.cc/544E-HTXG]. 
18. For example, in 2001 UNHCR launched a process of global consultations, culminating 
in the UNHCR Agenda for Protection, which had as one of its six protection goals, “Sharing 
burdens and responsibilities more equitably and building capacities to receive and protect 
refugees.”  In an attempt to generate concrete action based on the goals identified in the  
Agenda for Protection, UNHCR launched the Convention Plus initiative in 2003, aiming both to 
reinforce the relevance of the 1951 Refugee Convention and address its “gaps,” including 
responsibility sharing; unfortunately, however, the Convention Plus was largely unsuccessful in 
bringing about much real change.  Agenda for Protection in 2003. UNHCR, Dep’t of Int’l 
Protection, Agenda for Protection, 1, 9-10, 21-29, 55-61, U.N. Doc A/AC.96/965/Add.1  
(June 26, 2002), http://www.unhcr.org/protection/globalconsult/3e637b194/agenda-protection-thi 
rd-edition.html [https://perma.cc/C7PS-VX77]. 
19. For instance, the International Conference on Central American Refugees, 1987–1994 
(CIREFCA) and the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-Chinese Refugees, 1989–1997 
10
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(NGOs), academics, and others.20  During the summer of 2016, almost 
100 civil society organizations (CSOs) jointly urged states to adopt a 
concrete mechanism for responsibility sharing during the negotiations 
around the New York Declaration,21 and this collective call continued 
throughout the period in which the Compact was developed.22  However, 
the Declaration as adopted did not provide concrete ideas on how 
responsibility would be shared more equitably and predictably.  The 
decades-long failure to operationalize responsibility sharing is wholly 
political in nature.  However, this should not be considered inevitable. 
 
(Indochinese CPA), while not perfect, are both seen as relatively successful examples of regional 
cooperation and responsibility sharing in relation to refugees.  The attempts to find more 
comprehensive and sustainable solutions for displaced persons shown by African states, in the form 
of the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, and in 
Central America through the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees also demonstrate the potential for 
cooperation at a regional level.  UNHCR, The Global Compact on Responsibility-sharing for 
Refugees, §§ 2.2-2.3 (July 5, 2016), http://www.unhcr.org/57836fb54.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XL9-
SG62]; UNHCR, OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 
U.N. Doc. MRPI/C.3·OAU (Oct. 2006), https://www.unhcr.org/about-us/background/45dc1a682/ 
oau-convention-governing-specific-aspects-refugee-problems-africa-adopted.html [https://perma. 
cc/CS75-JG9X]; UNHCR, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, U.N. Doc. MRPI/C.4·Cartagena 
(Oct. 2006), https://www.unhcr.org/about-us/background/45dc19084/cartagena-declaration-
refugees-adopted-colloquium-international-protection.html [https://perma.cc/42K5-U74J]. 
20. See, for instance, the models for more predictable and equitable responsibility sharing 
suggested by academics such as Hathaway and Neve, as long ago as 1997, and Milner in 2016.  
James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again:  
A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 115 (1997); 
JAMES MILNER, GLOBAL LEADERSHIP & COOPERATION FOR REFUGEES, PAPER NO. 2, WHEN 
NORMS ARE NOT ENOUGH: UNDERSTANDING THE PRINCIPAL AND PRACTICE OF BURDEN AND 
RESPONSIBILITY SHARING FOR REFUGEES (Dec. 2016), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/ 
default/files/documents/Refugee%20Paper%20no2web_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3U4-BBBS]. 
21. See Civil Society Committee on the UN High-Level Summit on Refugees and Migrants 
2016, UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants 2016, UN REFUGEES & MIGRANTS (2016), 
http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/summit [https://perma.cc/RBS4-A3QV].  In particular, see the civil 
society response and scorecard for the New York Declaration, Civil Society Response and 
Scorecard for the UN High-Level Summit “New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants”, 
CIVIL SOCIETY (2016), http://refugees-migrants-civilsociety.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/0685-HLD_Act-Now-GB-DIGI-03_04-October.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
X3XV-L5FK]; and Amnesty International’s AMNESTY INT’L, THE GLOBAL REFUGEE CRISIS, 
GENUINE RESPONSIBILITY-SHARING: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL’S FIVE PROPOSALS (2016), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/IOR4043802016ENGLISH.PDF [https://perma. 
cc/22ME-LBWH]. 
22. See, e.g., UNHCR, NGO KEY MESSAGES FOR THE 10TH HIGH COMMISSIONER’S 
DIALOGUE ON PROTECTION CHALLENGES “TOWARDS A GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES” (Dec. 
12-13, 2017), https://www.unhcr.org/en-my/5a33d5917.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GWG-QHRB]. 
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The New York Declaration specifically envisioned a new approach 
that would improve the experience of refugees seeking protection and the 
ability of states to assist and protect them through greater international 
cooperation.23  This new agreement, finalized in September 2018 and 
called the Refugee Compact, is operational in nature, and includes as a 
goal a mechanism for equitable and predictable responsibility sharing.24  
With rigorous and continued debate, the support of civil society and other 
stakeholders, and positive political will, a concrete system for 
responsibility sharing is attainable through this Global Compact and its 
follow-up mechanisms.25 
Annex I of the New York Declaration called on the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to develop and 
initiate a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) in 
situations that involved large movements of refugees, in close 
coordination with national and local authorities and involving other U.N. 
agencies and a broad range of actors.26  The CRRF had four stated 
objectives: 
• ease pressures on host countries; 
• enhance refugees’ self-reliance; 
• expand access to third-country solutions; 
 
23. G.A. Res. A/71/L.1, at 3 (Sept. 13, 2016) (specifying the impetus and goals behind the 
New York Declaration). 
24. UNHCR, The Global Compact on Refugees (Final Draft) 2 (June 26, 2018), 
https://www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/07/Global-Compact-on-Refugees. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/H2PM-PC2W] (“[T]he global compact on refugees intends to provide a basis 
for predictable and equitable burden- and responsibility-sharing among all United Nations 
Member States, together with other relevant stakeholders as appropriate . . . .”) (emphasis original).  
See also Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Global Compact on Refugees, 73 U.N. 
G.A.O.R. Supp. No. 12, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/73/12 (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/gcr/ 
GCR_English.pdf [https://perma.cc/94AE-39CY]. 
25. UNHCR, The Global Compact on Refugees (Final Draft) 17 (June 26, 2018), 
https://www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/07/Global-Compact-on-Refugees. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/H2PM-PC2W]. 
26. Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Global Compact on Refugees, 73 U.N. 
G.A.O.R. Supp. No. 12, ¶ 7-13, U.N. Doc. A/73/12 (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/ 
gcr/GCR_English.pdf [https://perma.cc/94AE-39CY]; Comprehensive Refugee Response 
Framework, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/comprehensive-refugee-response-framework-crrf. 
html [https://perma.cc/DZ3Z-P5RP]. 
12
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• support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and 
dignity. 
UNHCR advocated for the Global Compact on Refugees to be based 
on lessons learned through application of the CRRF and a ‘Programme 
of Action’ that set out specific approaches that could be taken—both by 
Member States and by other relevant stakeholders—to underpin the 
CRRF and to ensure its concrete implementation, including more 
equitable sharing of responsibility for refugees.27  
The four key pillars of the CRRF related to:  
• refugee reception and admission; 
• support for immediate and ongoing needs; 
• support for host countries and communities; 
The Programme of Action was the subject of formal consultations and 
negotiations with Member States and other stakeholders early in 2018,28 
and ultimately the Global Compact on Refugees was a state-owned 
document—subject to the politics and policies of Member States, 
individually, as regional negotiating groups, and as part of other alliances. 
C. Issues Left Unresolved By The New York Declaration and Refugee 
Compact 
1. Protection and Support for IDPS 
Of the seventy million displaced people in the world, more than forty 
million have never crossed an international border and are internally 
displaced persons (IDPs).29  Like refugees, they experience the loss of 
livelihoods, protection, education, healthcare, and community networks, 
but they do not benefit from any internationally agreed protection 
 
27. UNHCR, TOWARDS A GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES, CONCEPT PAPER 2-17 (2017), 
http://www.unhcr.org/59dc8f317.pdf [https://perma.cc/SB4Y-GWAE] 
28. Formal Consultation on the Global Compact on Refugees, UNCHR, 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/formal-consultations-on-the-global-compact-on-refugees.html 
[https://perma.cc/HEY2-RYNL]. 
29. UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED MIGRATION IN 2018, at 35 (2019), 
https://www.unhcr.org/5d08d7ee7.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LYS-QK7L]; Adrian Edwards, Forced 
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framework, although regional commitments do exist in Latin America 
and the Caribbean,30 as well as in Africa.31 
The rights and needs of IDPs have been championed by a few key 
states, but a sufficient number of countries were unwilling for them to be 
included in the New York Declaration, which foreclosed their treatment 
in the Refugee Compact.32  The Declaration noted only the “need for 
reflection on effective strategies to ensure adequate protection and 
assistance for internally displaced persons and to prevent and reduce such 
displacement.”33 
With two-thirds of the world’s seventy million displaced people being 
IDPs—many in protracted situations of displacement and many facing 
similar challenges to those faced by refugees, including food insecurity, 
lack of livelihood opportunities, and poor or no services—there is indeed 
an urgent need for such reflection and action. 
2. Climate Change, Disasters, and Displacement 
The growing impact of climate change and disasters was also left 
largely unaddressed in the New York Declaration.34  Displacement 
linked to climate change is not a future threat but a current and growing 
reality, affecting millions of women, men, boys, and girls around the 
 
30. In 1994, the San José Declaration extended protections in the regional Cartagena 
framework to IDPs.  In Colombia, for example, there are particular protections for IDPs under the 
country’s 2011 Victims and Land Restitution Law.  L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO 
OFICIAL [D.O.] art. [13] (Colom.).  See also Marissa Esthimer, Protecting the Forcibly Displaced: 
Latin America’s Evolving Refugee and Asylum Framework, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., (Jan. 16, 
2016), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/print/15534#.W89UrFVKiM9 [https://perma.cc/PPQ6-
Z8WH]. 
31. The Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in 
Africa (the Kampala Convention) was the first international treaty to specifically address IDPs.  See 
African Union, Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in 
Africa (Kampala Convention) (Oct. 23, 2009), https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7796-treaty-
0039_-_kampala_convention_african_union_convention_for_the_protection_and_assistance_of_ 
internally_displaced_persons_in_africa_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DXW-PMPM]. 
32. IDPs were included in discussions at the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) held in 
Istanbul in May 2016, but the WHS was not a state-led meeting resulting in an outcome document 
by consensus, but rather sought individual commitments.  Press Release, Deputy Secretary-
General, Deputy Secretary-General, at World Summit Round-Table Event, Stresses Need to Move 
Away from Line Dividing Humanitarian, Development Efforts, U.N. Press Release DSG/SM/968-
IHA/1396 (May 23, 2018), https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/dsgsm968.doc.htm [https://perma. 
cc/57MY-BZF5]. 
33. G.A. Res. A/71/L.1, at 5 (Sept. 13, 2016). 
34. G.A. Res. A/71/1, at ¶ 1 (Sept. 19, 2016). 
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world.  Climate change is increasing the frequency and risk of disasters 
caused by extreme weather events, including floods and storms.  In 2016, 
some 23.5 million people were displaced internally by extreme weather 
disasters.35  At the same time, rising sea levels, shifting rainfall patterns, 
and other changes are eroding people’s livelihoods and security, and 
putting many more people at risk of displacement in the future.  Oxfam’s 
analysis of data on new displacements over the period 2008-2016 showed 
that people in low- and lower-middle-income countries were about five 
times more likely than people in high-income countries to be displaced 
by sudden-onset extreme weather disasters.36 
It is important that responding to the growing threat of displacement in 
the context of climate change begins with much stronger action to 
minimize displacement, through tackling its root causes and supporting 
communities facing various threats by reducing their vulnerability and 
building resilience.  At the same time, work is needed to strengthen 
protection and legal recognition for those who are on the move as a result 
of disasters and climate change.  While recognizing that all possible 
measures must be taken to avoid displacement, in cases where migration 
may be the only option for a family or community, it is necessary to 
support proactive, long-term strategies to ensure that those who are 
forced to move are able to do so safely, with dignity, and on their own 
terms.  UNHCR’s Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, Volker 
Türk, publicly asserted that individuals and families displaced by 
disasters should fall under the remit of the Global Compact on 
Refugees,37 and while this did not ultimately come to pass, there is no 
doubt that a growing number of individuals and families forced across 
borders by climate change and disasters will require more than ad hoc 
protection and support.  
 
35. Based on the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)’s dataset for Disaster-
Related New Displacements in 2016.  Global Internal Displacement Database, IDMC (2016), 
http://www.internal-displacement.org/database/ [https://perma.cc/5ENM-YJWR]. 
36. See OXFAM, UPROOTED BY CLIMATE CHANGE: RESPONDING TO THE GROWING RISK 
OF DISPLACEMENT 25 (2017), https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments 
/bp-uprooted-climate-change-displacement-021117-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FDX-3HHX].  
Specifically, the report recommends that the CRRF should be applicable to people displaced across 
borders by sudden-onset disasters, including extreme weather events. 
37. Faye Leone, “Sea Change” Refugee Compact Discussed in New York, SDG 
KNOWLEDGE HUB (June 28, 2018), http://sdg.iisd.org/news/sea-change-refugee-compact-
discussed-in-new-york/ [https://perma.cc/9KYR-UHX2]. 
15
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D. A Responsibility Sharing Model and a New Global Platform:          
A Proposal for a Way Forward 
As a means of stimulating debate and discussion, this paper proposes, 
for the first time, a model that assigns 193 governments across the world 
their fair share of responsibility for physical protection and financial 
support for refugees and host communities.  The proposed model 
comprises two components: first, the building of a comprehensive 
database and methodology to facilitate measurement of the capacity and 
resources available to each nation in support of these aims, regardless of 
location; and second, the development of a new Global Platform on 
Protection, Human Development, and Durable Solutions to support this 
initiative.38 
Both proposals have been reviewed and commented on by refugees 
and refugee-led organizations, and by more than twenty experts from 
academia, civil society, U.N. agencies, and different government bodies.  
The proposals are intentionally challenging, to encourage debate and 
engagement with and among governments, policymakers, advocates, and 
academics around the world as the Refugee Compact transitions from a 
collection of promises into a concrete operational platform for action. 
It is not asserted that these proposals are the definitive models which 
states should adopt.  However, by offering a concrete mechanism for 
responsibility sharing—with specific measurements, indicators and 
assignments of fair share—the intention is to be provocative.  It is our 
hope that this discussion paper will spur a robust discussion among states, 
policymakers, and other key stakeholders that goes beyond a general call 
for international cooperation to an overdue debate on how to make it 
happen.  Ultimately, we hope that this will result in the emergence of a 
new platform for action that is concrete, operational, fully articulated, and 
agreed to by the time of the second Global Refugee Forum in 2023.39 
 
38. For more detail on the methodology, see the Annexes.  Further information on the 
database is available from the authors. 
39. Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Global Compact on Refugees, 73 U.N. 
G.A.O.R. Supp. No. 12, ¶ 101-03, U.N. Doc. A/73/12 (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/ 
gcr/GCR_English.pdf [https://perma.cc/94AE-39CY]. 
16
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I.    MAIN FINDINGS IN APPLYING THE RESPONSIBILITY SHARING MODEL 
A. Short Methodology and Some Limitations of the RSM 
In this paper, a proposal is outlined for a new Responsibility Sharing 
Model (RSM) that identifies each nation’s fair share of responsibility for 
hosting, protecting, and assisting refugees and supporting host 
communities.40  This proposal is straightforward yet comprehensive.  It 
originates in the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, and seeks 
to promote the rights of all refugees to protection, education, assistance, 
healthcare, and livelihood opportunities41 by ensuring that all states have 
the capacity to progressively meet the needs of refugees.  This 
methodology first considers and weights the GDP and population of 
every state, to achieve a preliminary fair share of responsibility and 
burden sharing.  For these two data points, the authors relied on the 2016 
World Bank Database, which contained the latest available data at the 
time of development.42  The methodology then adjusts the baseline 




40. For more detail on the methodology, see the Annexes. 
41. Most of the provisions relating to employment, self-employment, and welfare under the 
Refugee Convention state that refugees shall be given “the most favorable treatment” accorded to 
other non-citizens “in the same circumstances.”  Restrictions on the employment of non-citizens 
must not be applied to refugees who have been in the country of refuge for over three years, who 
are married to a national of the country of refuge, or who have children possessing the nationality 
of the country of refuge.  In addition, in respect of housing and education, other than elementary 
education, refugees are again to be granted “treatment as favorable as possible and, in any event, 
not less favorable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances.”  In relation to 
elementary education, public relief and assistance, and the rationing of products in short supply 
(where a rationing system exists), refugees are to receive better treatment.  The U.N. Refugee 
Convention provides that refugees are to get “the same treatment as nationals” in these areas.  
Convention Plus at a Glance, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/403b30684.pdf  [https://perma.cc/ 
CTC5-LQ7S]; U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless 
Persons, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 21, U.N. Doc. 
COM&PI/C.1·CONV&PRO (Dec. 2010), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10.pdf#zoom=95 
[https://perma.cc/544E-HTXG]. 
42. Data available on World Bank Open Data, WORLD BANK (2019), https://data. 
worldbank.org/. 
43. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2016: 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT FOR EVERYONE (2016), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_ 
human_development_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZ98-GDF9]. 
17
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is one measurement of each nation’s progress toward the SDGs.44 
The authors considered excluding low-lying island states from the 
RSM, but as there is no definitive index listing those states that face an 
existential threat of ruin, this was not included.  When discussing a 
concrete methodology for responsibility sharing, countries should take 
into account the inherent vulnerability of these states and integrate this 
into a fair share approach. 
After identifying each nation’s fair share based on this methodology, 
we then applied the Fragile States Index.45  All states assigned “alert” 
status in the index (90 points or higher)46  were removed from the 
responsibility sharing allocations, because by definition they are already 
unstable.  Given their fragility, it is not fair to those countries to assign 
responsibility for supporting refugees, although more than seven million 
refugees (almost one-third of the total) do currently reside in fragile 
 
44. Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UN 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2015), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transform 
ingourworld [https://perma.cc/3BRS-X6NZ]. 
45. The Fragile States Index ranks 178 nations based on their levels of stability and the 
pressures they face, according to the Fund for Peace’s proprietary Conflict Assessment Tool 
(CAST).  Scores are given to each country based on twelve key political, social, and economic 
indicators, with over 100 sub-indicators, indicating its level of stability.  For more details, see Data 
for Peace, FFP (2018), http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/data/.  The authors were conflicted as to whether 
to use the Fragile States Index for purposes of assessing the capacity of a nation to receive and 
protect refugees, given fair and detailed criticism of the Index on a number of fronts, including: (1) 
that the Index suffers from a Eurocentric bias favorably weighting democracies in the global north, 
despite their poor performance on many fronts including xenophobia and racism, which is currently 
even more apparent; and (2) an unwillingness to account for, or wrestle with, the fact that many of 
the states deemed most fragile are also states that have been subject to the intervention of wealthier 
nations, including Iraq, Syria, and Libya.  Nonetheless, the authors chose to factor in the Fragile 
States Index because its inclusion demonstrates incontestably that wealthier nations have the 
capacity and can do much more to receive and protect refugees, given that most of the countries 
deemed most at risk of emergency are also countries hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees.  
The authors also note that whether included or excluded, the Fragile States Index does not 
materially alter the findings of the RSM.  A detailed explanation of this conclusion can be found in 
Annex I, Methodology. 
46. The higher a country’s score on the Fragile States Index, the more unstable it is.  
Countries with a score of 90 or above are categorized as “alert” (e.g. Timor-Leste at 90.5 and 
Burundi at 98.9), those above 100 as “high alert” (e.g. Ethiopia at 101.1 and Chad at 109.4), and 
those above 110 as “very high alert” (e.g. Sudan at 110.6 and South Sudan with the highest score 
of 113.9).  These figures are taken from the 2017 Fragile States Index.  FFP, 2017 FRAGILE STATES 
INDEX (2017), https://issuu.com/fundforpeace/docs/951171705_fragile_states_index_annu. 
18
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states.47  The fact that one-third of all refugees reside in fragile states is 
a clear demonstration that the current system of refugee “protection” is 
utterly broken. 
This model then converts each nation’s fair share of responsibility for 
refugees into a specific number of refugees,48 based on the 2016 UNHCR 
Population Statistics Database49 and 2016 figures from the U.N. Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).50 
B. Some Limitations of the RSM 
This proposal does not pretend to address every opportunity or 
challenge involved in the protection and support of refugees and host 
communities.  Sections highlight the specific limitations of each 
proposal, but there are a few overall limitations that are worth 
highlighting here. 
These proposals provide a global approach to refugee protection and 
assistance only and cannot substitute for context-specific knowledge, 
address circumstances that create challenges and opportunities in 
different regions, or offer detailed analysis of how each government’s 
proposals or positions are developed.  Wherever possible, the authors 
have worked with civil society and refugees in affected countries to best 
reflect their understanding of specific contexts, politics, and government 
efforts. 
Nevertheless, in a broad and propositional methodology such as this, 
some individual countries may be picked out as “high performers” in 
terms of responsibility sharing because they permit the entry of large 
numbers of refugees (offering physical protection), even though their 
 
47. See Annex 3.  Roughly 7.6 million refugees were recorded as being hosted in states that 
scored above 90 on the Fragile States Index in 2016. 
48. For purposes of this paper, “responsibility” includes physical protection, whether 
through refugee resettlement or the processing of people seeking asylum, and contributions of both 
humanitarian and development support to host countries.  Except in very limited circumstances, 
neither physical protection nor the contribution of funds alone would satisfy a nation’s 
responsibility, as states hosting the largest numbers of refugees consistently require the sharing of 
physical and financial protection.  The authors assert that states should provide physical support, 
through refugee resettlement or asylum protection, to at least 10% of the total number of refugees 
for which they are responsible.  
49. An overview can be found at: Population Statistics, UNHCR (2018), 
http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview. 
50. See UNRWA, IN FIGURES (2016), https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/content/ 
resources/unrwa_in_figures_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5YG-KQRU]. 
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domestic practices may not sufficiently support the human development 
of refugees and host communities (e.g. access to education, livelihood 
opportunities, adequate housing, and healthcare, among others).51  Other 
countries may be “low performers” in terms of physical protection, but 
may extend key human rights quickly and broadly.52  However, on 
balance we consider that the proposals put forward provide a strong 
foundation from which to gauge the capacity of governments to extend 
protection and support to refugees and host communities, while 
measuring the current gaps and some of their consequences. 
C. Main Findings After Application of the RSM 
Once a methodology53 for the model approach to responsibility 
sharing was agreed upon, the authors applied the formula to the 193 U.N. 
Member States in order to better understand the fair share of each country 
in terms of protecting and supporting refugees, whether and how 
countries are currently meeting their fair shares, and to begin to identify 
opportunities for improvement and to propose paths forward. 
These findings are ultimately represented through the assignment to 
each country of a specific number of refugees, based on the current 
population of twenty-six million plus refugees and asylum seekers 
globally.54  The tables, data sets, and analysis that follow are based on 
the current picture of refugee needs and response.  But this snapshot is 
 
51. Jordan, for instance, is the highest-performing country according to this mechanism.  
However, Human Rights Watch reports that 80,000 Syrian children in Jordan had no access to 
education in 2016, and between January and June restrictions on freedom of movement left 
thousands of asylum seekers stranded in harsh conditions with limited access to food, water, and 
medical assistance.  Jordan: Events of 2016, HUM RTS. WATCH (2017), https://www.hrw.org/ 
world-report/2017/country-chapters/Jordan [https://perma.cc/TP5P-T7XA].  Lebanon, which is the 
third highest performer, has strict residency regulations that restrict refugees’ access to work, 
education, and healthcare, and which put them at risk of detention.  Lebanon: New Refugee Policy 
a Step Forward, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 14, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/ 
02/14/lebanon-new-refugee-policy-step-forward [https://perma.cc/W8GQ-QXEC]. 
52. For example, Portugal, which fulfilled only two percent of its fair share, supports 
refugees on many of their key rights, including the provision of temporary free housing, language 
classes, and the ability to work while claims are processed.  Argentina hosted 3,293 refugees in 
2016, also only two percent of its fair share, but it recognizes migration as a right, provides social 
assistance to refugees, and provides access to healthcare and education to foreigners under the same 
conditions as nationals, regardless of their migration status. 
53. The detailed methodology is provided in Annex 1. 
54. UNHCR, FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2017 (2018), https://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/J8SD-GQ2A]. 
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not the end of the analysis.  The Responsibility Sharing Model (RSM) 
allows for updating at any time—weekly, monthly, annually, or 
otherwise.  Indeed, it could be employed by countries, U.N. agencies, and 
other stakeholders as a new crisis is unfolding. 
Whatever model for a predictable and equitable responsibility sharing 
mechanism is agreed upon should be used dynamically so that as 
populations of refugees arrive in countries, states have an immediate 
ability to determine their fair share of responsibility for physical 
protection and financial support, analyze how they can best support 
refugees and host communities, and act accordingly.  Some key findings 
of the RSM are set out in the following subsection. 
1. Most Countries Should be Doing Much More, but Some are Taking 
on a Disproportionate Amount of Responsibility for Refugees and 
Host Communities 
The first and most important point is that the twenty biggest economies 
in the world, which have the greatest capacity to both physically protect 
and support refugees globally, are failing miserably.  Based on a review 
of UNHCR data in 2016, members of the G20 contribute less than 40% 
of their fair share to refugee protection, whereas the rest of the world, 
with far fewer resources and less capacity, is extending a huge six times 
its fair share (see Figure 1).55  Significantly, Turkey accounts for almost 
40% of all the refugees hosted in G20 nations.  If Turkey were excluded 
from this analysis, the G20 countries would be taking responsibility for 
less than 15% of their fair share. 
  
 
55. Population Statistics, UNHCR (2018), http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview.   
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FIGURE 1: CONTRIBUTION OF G20 COUNTRIES TO PHYSICAL 
PROTECTION COMPARED WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD 
 
In total, 113 of the 193 countries analyzed are doing less than half of 
what they could fairly be expected to do in terms of protecting refugees, 
when looking only at the numbers being hosted.  At the same time, thirty-
five countries are surpassing their fair share of responsibility, with ten 
doing more than ten times their fair share.56 
  
 













Based on 2016 UNHCR
and UNRWA numbers
* Almost 36.5% of these refugees 
and asylum seekers are in Turkey
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FIGURE 2: COUNTRIES’ OVERALL FAIR SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY 
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FIGURE 3: WHERE REFUGEES ARE PHYSICALLY RESIDING CURRENTLY 
 
Figure 3 takes into account physical protection only.  All of the named 
countries except the United States and the European Union, however, 
take on much more than 100% of their fair share of physical protection 
and they contribute millions of dollars domestically in support of these 
populations, meaning that they do not have an additional responsibility 
for financially supporting refugees not already residing in these countries.  
It is fair to criticize Figure 3 for being incomplete, as it does not take into 
account the financial contributions made to host states by others, such as 
the United States, the European Union, and Canada.  Unfortunately, and 
as discussed below, it is exceptionally difficult to determine the financial 
contributions of states to refugee and host communities beyond those 
made to UNHCR and UNRWA each year (which the authors do provide 
below).  The authors would encourage all countries to provide 
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comprehensive data on their financial contributions in support of refugees 
and host communities each year, so that whatever RSM is eventually 
adopted may accurately account for these contributions.  Even accepting 
the criticism, though, almost no high capacity state (except Germany and 
Sweden) comes close to extending physical protection to ten percent of 
the refugees for whom it bears responsibility. 
2. The Vast Majority of Refugees Reside in Africa and Asia 






Particularly in the United States and the European Union, there is often 
a false sense among some elected leaders, policymakers, political pundits, 
and citizens that they are shouldering the majority of responsibility for 
refugees, and that all refugees would travel to one of these regions if 
given the opportunity.  This is not true.  In fact, the vast majority of 
refugees live in Africa or Asia (including the Middle East) for as long as 
the underlying driver of their displacement continues. 
3. The Vast Majority of Refugees are in a few Countries 
Table 1 below applies the RSM to identify the seven countries globally 
hosting the highest numbers of refugees.  The first column identifies the 
percentage of the refugee population that each country should be 
responsible for based on the RSM.  The second column applies the fair 
share percentage to the total number of refugees globally, resulting in a 
specific responsibility.  The third column identifies the total number of 















# of refugees currently hosted Fair Share # of refugees
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refugees that were actually being hosted in each country in 2016, based 
on UNHCR’s Statistics Database.57  For example, based on the fair share 
model, Turkey is responsible for 1.03% of the world’s refugees, which 
equals 261,096 individuals.  Yet Turkey is hosting almost three million 
refugees, exceptionally above its fair share. 
Based on the RSM, Pakistan’s fair share is 0%, because it is considered 
a fragile state.  Uganda and Ethiopia are also fragile states and therefore 
are not assigned a specific responsibility for refugees, and the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory (OPT) is not recognized as a state by most U.N. 
members.  That said, despite their fragility, Pakistan was hosting more 
than a million refugees in 2016, while Uganda, Ethiopia, and a number 
of other fragile states were hosting up to millions of refugees.58 
TABLE 1: COUNTRIES HOSTING THE MOST REFUGEES GLOBALLY 





Fair share # 
of refugees 
# of refugees 
currently 
hosted 
1 Turkey 1.03% 261,096  3,115,376  
2 Jordan 0.06% 14,395  2,897,303  
3 Lebanon 0.06% 15,160  1,476,671  
4 Pakistan 0.00% -    1,357,416  
5 Germany 5.37% 1,365,599  1,256,828  
6 Uganda 0.00% -    982,715  
7 
Iran,  
Islamic Rep. 0.62% 156,841  979,526  
 
 
57. Population Statistics, UNHCR (2018), http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview. 
58. As noted earlier, the authors were conflicted about including the Fragile States Index in 
the RSM.  That said, each of these states is still well above its fair share, even absent the Fragile 
States Index.  See Annex I, Methodology. 
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4. The Countries Doing the Most to Support Refugees and Host 
Communities Based on Their Fair Share59 
Table 2 applies the RSM to the top hosting countries globally.  The 
first column again identifies the percentage of the refugee population 
globally that each country should be responsible for, based on the RSM.  
The second column applies the fair share percentage to the total number 
of refugees, resulting in a whole number.  The third column identifies the 
total number of refugees that were actually being hosted in each country 
in 2016, based on UNHCR’s Statistics Database.60  The fourth column 
represents the difference between the number of refugees that a country 
should be hosting or supporting, based on the RSM, and the number of 
refugees actually being hosted in that country.  The fifth column 
represents the percentage by which they are extending refugee support 
over and above their fair share, which is determined by dividing the 
second column by the third column. 
All of the countries shown in Table 2 are taking far above their fair 
share of responsibility for refugees, in terms of both physical protection 
and humanitarian support.  Large host governments are often assumed 
only to be providing physical protection for refugees, but the reality is 
that they also absorb the vast majority of the costs of infrastructural 
expansions to schools, healthcare systems, and housing, as well as the 
cost of deterioration of infrastructure such as roads and other services 
overly stressed by the rapid arrival of thousands of refugees.  Of course, 
countries hosting large numbers of refugees may also extend additional 
support to refugees around the world, beyond those in their territories.  
Indeed, Sweden, Austria, and Jordan, which are all at or above their fair 
share of physical protection, contribute substantially to refugee protection 
and support beyond the refugees they host domestically (as evidenced in 
Table 3 below). 
Uganda, Pakistan, and Ethiopia are also hosting well above their fair 
share, as shown in Table 2.  They are fragile states and therefore should 
 
59. Table 2 is limited to countries hosting at least 50,000 refugees. 
60. The authors decided to include only those identified as refugees for the purposes of this 
analysis.  Some countries, such as Germany, also have hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers 
recorded, but because recognition for these people and their ability to remain are dependent on a 
legal status that has not been determined, including them in the totals would be misleading.  The 
authors acknowledge the extensive support and assistance provided by Germany and other nations 
to asylum seekers while they undergo the asylum process. 
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not be responsible for refugees at all—even though in reality they take on 
a disproportionate share of responsibility for protection and care.  This is 
not to take away from their acts of solidarity and generosity, but rather to 
highlight the need for much greater solidarity and welcome on the part of 
wealthier and more able countries around the world. 
TABLE 2: TOP HOSTING COUNTRIES ARE PERFORMING 























1 Jordan 0.06% 14,395  2,897,303  (2,882,908) 20127% 
2 Lebanon 0.06% 15,160  1,476,671  (1,461,511) 9740% 
3 Tanzania 0.07% 17,892  290,037  (272,145) 1621% 
4 Turkey 1.03% 261,096  3,115,376  (2,854,280) 1193% 
5 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 0.62% 156,841  979,526  (822,685) 625% 
6 South Africa 0.27% 67,885  309,942  (242,057) 457% 
7 Ecuador 0.12% 30,281  127,390  (97,109) 421% 
8 Bangladesh 0.30% 75,106  276,208  (201,102) 368% 
9 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 0.39% 99,365  263,407  (164,042) 265% 
10 Sweden 0.74% 189,152  313,267  (124,115) 166% 
5. The RSM Applied to the Amount of Funding Provided by each 
Country to UNHCR and UNRWA in 2016 
Table 3 applies the RSM to the humanitarian funding contributed by 
countries to UNHCR and UNRWA in 2016.  The first column shows the 
RSM-based fair share of responsibility.  The second column shows the 
difference between the number of refugees represented by a country’s fair 
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share and the number of refugees actually hosted in that country in 2016.  
The number of refugees hosted is subtracted for purposes of this analysis 
because those refugees represent a taking up of physical and financial 
responsibility. 
The third column identifies the total monetary contributions made to 
UNHCR and UNRWA in 2016.  That total is then divided by the 
remainder of refugees (column two) for which countries have 
responsibility, and identifies how much funding is received by each 
refugee for which the country has responsibility.  The fourth column 
identifies this amount for each country—a more meaningful 
measurement of support to refugees for whom they have responsibility, 
rather than simply looking at the total amount of funding provided by 
each country. 
Sweden, Austria, Turkey, and Jordan are identified as contributing 
“Fair share +” because not only did they meet their fair share of 
responsibility through refugee hosting and financial support alone, but 
through UNHCR and UNRWA they also each contributed significant 
amounts of funding to refugee support globally ($195m, $8.8m, $2.5m, 
and $1.5m respectively). 
For example, based on the RSM, Norway is responsible for 129,457 
refugees.  In 2016, it hosted 59,522 refugees.  In this analysis, the number 
of refugees hosted was subtracted from the total fair share, leaving a 
remainder of 71,897 refugees that the country is not hosting.  Norway 
contributed a total of $147,089,541 to UNHCR in 2016 and UNRWA in 
2016 which is the equivalent of $2,045.84 per refugee. 
As another example, as in other years, the U.S. contributed more 
funding overall in 2016 than any other nation (almost $2bn).  While this 
is a significant amount of support to UNHCR and UNRWA, based on the 
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TABLE 3: COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTING THE MOST HUMANITARIAN 




















1 Sweden 0.74% (124,115) 195,037,096  Fair share +  
2 Austria 0.54% (33,068) 8,848,959  Fair share +  
3 Turkey 1.03% (2,854,280) 2,500,000  Fair share +  
4 Jordan 0.06% (2,882,908) 1,508,265  Fair share +  
5 Germany 5.37% 108,771  433,749,680  3,987.7  
6 Norway 0.57% 76,945  143,256,207  1,861.8  
7 Denmark 0.46% 77,371  75,397,849  974.5  
8 Luxembourg 0.08% 16,586  14,258,804  859.7  
9 Saudi Arabia 0.88% 223,514  162,426,790  726.7  
10 Kuwait 0.14% 33,069  22,066,762  667.3  
11 Finland 0.33% 60,321  33,315,916  552.3  
12 Switzerland 1.00% 140,254  8,471,013  488.2  
13 Netherlands 1.17% 184,569  81,173,021  439.8  
14 Iceland 0.03% 7,152  3,047,602  426.1  
15 Belgium 0.66% 101,511  38,841,344  382.6  
16 United Kingdom 3.85% 813,558  295,336,636  363.0  
17 United States 27.17% 6,095,830  1,882,266,188  308.8  
18 Canada 2.28% 459,511  134,732,852  293.2  
 
61. Countries that contributed more than $1m in 2016. 
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D. Some Limitations 
1. Funding Analysis is Limited to UNHCR and UNRWA 
Table 3 applies the RSM to the humanitarian funding contributed by 
countries to UNHCR and UNRWA in 2016 only.62  Without a doubt, this 
does not give a full picture of financial support to refugee-hosting 
countries.  Many countries contribute to displacement response through 
emergency funding via the U.N. Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),63 direct contributions to NGOs, and 
direct support to governments hosting refugees.  Many countries 
contribute to pooled funding—for example, European countries 
providing support through ECHO and DEVCO.64  Multiple states, U.N. 
agencies, and international financial institutions (IFIs) are engaged in 
joint programs of work, including the Jordan and Lebanon Compacts.65 
 
62. UNHCR, CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNHCR (2016), http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/ 
files/donor_ranking/2016%20-%20UNHCR%20Donor%20Ranking%20by%20Country.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KF4P-PB9Z]; UNRWA, PLEDGES TO UNRWA (2015), https://www.unrwa.org/ 
sites/default/files/2015_donors_ranking_overall.pdf [https://perma.cc/84AE-ZBPH]. 
63. OCHA’s Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and its Country-Based Pooled 
Funds (CBPFs) provide, respectively, a global fund and country-based pooled funds which can be 
used to rapidly provide initial funding at the onset of a humanitarian crisis, and which can provide 
support for poorly funded humanitarian response operations.  Who We Are, U.N. CENT. 
EMERGENCY RELIEF FUND, https://cerf.un.org/about-us/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/6862-
5MNL]; U.N. DOCS FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMAN AFFAIRS, COUNTRY-BASED POOLED 
FUNDS AND THE GRAND BARGAIN (June 5, 2017); https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/ 
www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/cbpf-gb_factsheet_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
TL5J-DHNS]. 
64. The European Commission’s Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and 
Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) primarily provides humanitarian aid from the EU through 
the funding of partner organizations that deliver to beneficiaries, including the U.N., the Red 
Cross/Red Crescent Movement, and NGOs.  The Commission’s Directorate-General for 
International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) works with other Commission services, 
as well as with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and Commission services, on 
external action to facilitate cooperation and ensure the coherence of development and thematic 
policies.  Monique Pariat, Message From the Director-General, EUR. CIVIL PROTECTION & 
HUMANITARIAN AID OPERATIONS (Jan. 7, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/echo/who-we-are/about-
echo/director-general_en [https://perma.cc/2CRP-ENNS]. 
65. These compacts are mutual commitments made between the EU and Jordan and the EU 
and Lebanon respectively.  They aim to fulfill pledges made at the London conference on 
supporting Syria and the region in February 2016, in order to improve the living conditions of 
refugees and vulnerable host communities in Jordan and Lebanon.  The commitments include 
financial contributions by the EU (including humanitarian aid, macro-financial assistance, and 
bilateral assistance), in return for which Jordan and Lebanon have agreed to improve conditions 
and services for refugees living within their borders.  EUR. COMM’N, EU-JORDAN PARTNERSHIP 
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It is exceptionally difficult, if not impossible, to identify all the 
humanitarian and development funding that each country contributes 
toward refugees and host communities in a single year.  In some cases, 
this is due to a lack of transparency, which is an issue in its own right that 
needs to be addressed.  In other cases, financial contributions may not be 
earmarked specifically for refugee or host communities but may have a 
direct or indirect impact on their lives and experiences.  In still others, 
financial contributions move through pooled or other complex structures 
and are very difficult to follow to their final destinations. 
Equally importantly, both UNHCR and UNRWA are mandated as the 
primary actors for the protection of refugees.  Their core responsibility is 
constantly undermined, however, because they are chronically 
underfunded.  This has real consequences for refugees and host 
communities, including the absence of or insufficient programs that 
support education, livelihood opportunities, healthcare, and protection 
programming for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence 
(SGBV).66 
States should continue to explore new and collaborative approaches to 
humanitarian and development funding.  The new global model proposed 
in this paper could certainly serve as a focal point for these discussions, 
but states should also ensure that both UNHCR and UNRWA are always 
funded in full: they are the primary lifeline for millions of refugees 
around the world. 
 
(Mar. 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/jordan-compact.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7DAQ-4KHD]; EUR. COMM’N, EU-LEBANON PARTNERSHIP (Aug. 2017), 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/lebanon-compact.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NY46-V2C9]. 
66. The results of underfunding in 2016 can be demonstrated by just a handful of concrete 
examples from hosting countries.  In Lebanon, for instance, funding of only 75 percent of need 
meant that 120,000 refugees were unable to renew their UNHCR refugee registration certificates.  
In Ethiopia, at 70 percent of required funding, no practical solution could be implemented for the 
energy shortages faced in most refugee camps.  In Iran, at 54 percent of required funding, UNHCR 
was able to support the construction of only 16 of the 30 schools it had planned to build.  In 
Pakistan, with funding at 40 percent of need, an estimated 20,000-40,000 refugee children were 
unable to access education.  And in Turkey, at only 36 percent of required funding, UNHCR’s cash 
assistance was able to cover less than 2 percent of the non-Syrian caseload and the backlog of 
refugee status determination cases continued to increase.  For country-by-country outlines, see 
Reporting, UNHCR, http://reporting.unhcr.org/operations. 
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2. The RSM Does Not Measure the Quality of Protection 
Many of the “high-performing” countries also provide refugees with 
access to basic rights and services beyond permitting them to remain 
while conflict persists in their home countries.  Sweden, Turkey, Jordan, 
Uganda, and Lebanon, among others, all extend access to education, 
livelihood opportunities, and healthcare to refugees, although the levels 
of access are different and often vary based on the refugees’ 
nationalities.67 
There are also high-performing countries which, while permitting 
people to cross their borders, do not allow them to access other basic 
rights such as education, healthcare, adequate housing, or livelihood 
opportunities, and may require refugees to live in camps or otherwise 
restrict their movement.  While their respect for the fundamental principle 
of non-refoulement should be acknowledged, these countries should still 
be taking steps to fulfill other basic rights for refugees while they are in 
exile.  When they do not have sufficient capacity or infrastructure to 
absorb newly arriving, or longstanding, populations of refugees, other 
states should be supporting them in a timely manner with humanitarian 
and development funding, as well as committing to taking responsibility 
for at least 10% of the physical protection of refugees, through 
resettlement and/or other alternative pathways (see below). 
The establishment of a global platform is proposed in Section II to 
support cooperation between countries when physical protection and 
financial support is required.  To directly address issues related to the 
quality of protection, it could set as a precondition that hosting states 
submit a concrete plan for achieving refugee access to education, 
livelihood opportunities, healthcare, and adequate shelter, among other 
rights.  These plans could then be analyzed and further developed and 
funded within the structure of the proposed global platform. 
  
 
67. See, e.g., Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees Covering the Period 1 July 2016-
30 June 2017, ¶ 31-34, 72 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/72/12 (Aug. 15, 2017), 
https://undocs.org/A/72/12 (Uganda). 
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E. The Countries Doing the Least to Support Refugees and 
Host Communities Based on Their Fair Share 
Table 4 applies the proposed RSM to countries hosting at least 50,000 
refugees, and then ranks them based on the amount of physical protection 
they provide.  The first column again identifies the percentage of the 
refugee population globally (26 million +) that the country should be 
responsible for, based on the RSM.  The second column applies the fair 
share percentage to the total number of refugees, resulting in a whole 
number.  The third column identifies the total number of refugees that 
were actually being hosted in each country in 2016.  The fourth column 
represents the difference between the number of refugees that a country 
should be hosting or supporting, based on the RSM, and the number of 
refugees actually being hosted in that country.  The fifth column 
represents what percentage of their fair share countries are meeting in the 
physical protection of refugees.  As above, this table does not take into 
account humanitarian and development funding, but none of these 
countries come close to meeting their fair share of responsibility overall. 
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TABLE 4: COUNTRIES DOING THE LEAST TO PHYSICALLY SUPPORT 






















1 Singapore 0.45% 114,468  -    114,468  0% 
2 Vietnam 0.30% 75,721  -    75,721  0% 
3 Saudi Arabia 0.88% 223,704  190  223,514  0% 
4 Philippines 0.38% 95,813  622  95,191  1% 
5 Colombia 0.33% 82,682  644  82,038  1% 
6 Japan 7.24% 1,842,779  21,315  1,821,464  1% 
7 
U. Arab 
Emirates 0.43% 110,606  1,507  109,099  1% 
8 Kazakhstan 0.20% 51,103  790  50,313  2% 
9 Korea, Rep. 2.12% 540,192  8,668  531,524  2% 
10 
New 
Zealand 0.28% 70,226  1,724  68,502  2% 
11 Mexico 1.28% 326,804  8,849  317,955  3% 
12 Portugal 0.27% 69,830  2,052  67,778  3% 
13 Argentina 0.77% 196,599  7,284  189,315  4% 
14 Romania 0.27% 69,549  2,979  66,570  4% 
15 Indonesia 1.06% 269,975  14,405  255,570  5% 
16 Chile 0.36% 91,716  4,960  86,756  5% 
17 
Czech 
Republic 0.29% 73,057  4,419  68,638  6% 
18 Spain 1.76% 446,622  33,349  413,273  7% 
19 Brazil 2.13% 541,574  45,153  496,421  8% 
20 Poland 0.71% 180,683  15,178  165,505  8% 
21 Ireland 0.43% 110,431  10,053  100,378  9% 
22 Peru 0.24% 59,872  6,041  53,831  10% 
23 China 12.19% 3,101,168  317,923  2,783,245  10% 
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Table 5 highlights countries that are doing very little to support 
refugees financially, based on the RSM.  As before, the first column 
shows the RSM-based fair share of responsibility.  The second column is 
the difference between the number of refugees according to a country’s 
fair share and the number of refugees actually hosted in that country in 
2016.  The number of refugees hosted is subtracted for the purposes of 
this analysis because those refugees represent a partial taking up of 
responsibility.   
The third column identifies the total monetary contributions made to 
UNHCR and UNRWA in 2016 and that monetary number is divided by 
the remainder of refugees (column two).  The fourth column identifies 
the amount that each country provided in support of each of the remainder 
of refugees for which it had responsibility—a more meaningful 
measurement of contributions than simply looking at the total monetary 
amount of funding provided.  Ranging from $0.02 to $3.00 per refugee 
per year, the support they are providing is woefully inadequate.  These 
states can and should be doing much more to ensure basic protection and 
support to refugees, regardless of their location. 
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TABLE 5: COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTING THE LEAST HUMANITARIAN 
FUNDING PER REFUGEE TO UNHCR AND UNRWA 



















1 Philippines 0.38% 95,191  20,000  0.21  
2 Indonesia 1.06% 255,570  65,000  0.25  
3 Sri Lanka 0.14% 33,930  10,000  0.29  
4 Singapore 0.45% 114,468  60,000  0.52  
5 Peru 0.24% 53,831  49,642  0.92  
6 Chile 0.36% 86,756  82,500  0.95  
7 Mexico 1.28% 317,955  305,000  0.96  
8 Morocco 0.11% 22,308  24,299  1.09  
9 China 12.19% 2,783,245  3,117,942  1.12  
10 Israel 0.46% 73,143  100,000  1.37  
11 Costa Rica 0.07% 10,092  15,453  1.53  
12 Uruguay 0.07% 16,368  30,000  1.83  
13 India 3.03% 563,794  1,264,788  2.24  
14 Kazakhstan 0.20% 50,313  124,916  2.48  
15 Azerbaijan 0.06% 14,072  40,007  2.84  
16 Argentina 0.77% 189,315  563,420  2.98  
The authors explored but ultimately decided not to assign a monetary 
value required to support a refugee anywhere in the world, given ethical 
concerns about assigning a “cost” to refugees and the wide variance in 
the extension of protection and rights, based on economics, politics, 
social contexts, and regional practices.  Instead, this paper proposes that 
countries pledge a combination of support for refugees that both extends 
physical protection (hosting, resettlement, and alternative pathways) to at 
least 10% of their fair share, and contributes to the protection and support 
of refugees financially, regardless of where they are located. 
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That said, in 2016, UNHCR budgeted $7.5 billion for a total of 22.5 
million refugees.  When the amount of refugees is divided into the budget 
request, this equals $333.33 per refugee.  This would already seem to be 
inadequate to support the protection and rights of a refugee for a year.  
Worse, neither UNHCR nor UNRWA received close to that amount of 
funding from the international community.  In 2016, UNHCR received 
just under $4 billion,68 and UNRWA received just under $1.25 billion69 
for a total together of just over $5 billion.  When divided across all 
refugees under the protection mandate of UNHCR and UNRWA, (26 
million +) refugees were allocated just $223 for protection and assistance 
in 2016.  This is unacceptable.70 
This paper proposes that countries aim to provide physical protection 
to at least 10% of their fair share of refugees based on need and regardless 
of ethnicity, religion, or country of origin.71  This amount is based on 
UNHCR assessment that about 10% of all refugees are in need of 
resettlement every year due to specific vulnerabilities.72  The arrival of 
 
68. UNHCR, CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNHCR (2016), http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/ 
files/donor_ranking/2016%20-%20UNHCR%20Donor%20Ranking%20by%20Country.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KF4P-PB9Z]. 
69. UNRWA, 2016 PLEDGES TO UNRWA’S PROGRAMMES (2016), 
https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/donor_ranking_with_un_agencies_overall.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7DBE-CJMP]. 
70. In 2018, the Trump Administration ceased all U.S. funding to UNRWA, a devastating 
blow that has been felt in Palestinian homes, schools, and communities.  See DARYL GRISGRABER, 
REFUGEES INT’L, THE THOUSANDTH CUT: ELIMINATING U.S. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO 
GAZA (Nov. 2018), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/506c8ea1e4b01d9450dd53f5/t/5be84ae 
10e2e721437a5e13b/1541950186414/Gaza+Report+-+November+2018+-+Final+11.11.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/93JE-NUTH].  
71. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403, 2415, 2417, 2421 
(2018) (finding the restriction of entry for people from certain majority-Muslim countries “squarely 
within the scope of Presidential authority under the [Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(f) (2018)][,]” and further that, “[Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 
(2017)] is expressly premised on legitimate purposes: preventing entry of nationals who cannot be 
adequately vetted and inducing other nations to improve their practices.  The text says nothing 
about religion.”  Despite then-candidate Trump calling for a “total and complete shutdown of 
Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going 
on.”  “[O]ne of the [now-]President’s campaign advisers explained that when the President ‘first 
announced it, he said, “Muslim ban.”  He called me up.  He said, “Put a commission together.  
Show me the right way to do it legally.”’”). 
72. UNHCR estimates that roughly 10% of refugees require resettlement based on particular 
needs that cannot be addressed in the country in which they have sought protection, including those 
requiring special legal and physical protection or medical attention, survivors of violence and 
torture, women at risk, children and adolescents and the elderly, and those in need of family 
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asylum seekers should not be used to justify the curbing of resettlement 
programs.  Receiving and protecting asylum seekers is a domestic 
responsibility that is related to, but is not the same as, the responsibility 
to resettle the most vulnerable refugees from countries of first asylum.  
Similarly, development funds should not be used to resettle refugees 
domestically.  Development assistance is designed to alleviate and 
ultimately eradicate poverty overseas.  Applying development funds to 
resettlement costs undermines these goals.73   
Moreover, every country should make commitments both to extend 
physical protection to refugees through asylum, refugee hosting, 
refraining from pushbacks and other actions that put refugees and 
vulnerable migrants at heightened risk of serious human rights violations 
(including breach of the principle of non-refoulement)74 and to 
 
reunification or who lack prospects for local integration.  Unfortunately, while more than a million 
refugees were identified as being in need according to these criteria in 2015, less than 1% were 
resettled in that year; clearly, there is a need to provide physical protection for these refugees as a 
very minimum standard that is not currently being met.  See, e.g., UNHCR, REFUGEE 
RESETTLEMENT TRENDS 2015 (2015), http://www.unhcr.org/protection/resettlement/559ce97f9/ 
unhcr-refugee-resettlement-trends-2015.html. 
73. While poverty reduction in all countries, both at home and abroad, is important, 
categorizing domestic spending as part of “development funding” risks “aid inflation,” as well  
as the increased chance that funds will not go towards genuine development activities.  
Development assistance should contribute to poverty eradication, with regard to Agenda 2030,  
and focusing on domestic refugee resettlement risks impeding the development of this policy 
framework and undermining the aid effectiveness principles.  For more on the misapplication  
of development funds in the areas of migration and displacement, see OXFAM, AN EMERGENCY 
FOR WHOM? (2017), https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp-
emergency-for-whom-eutf-africa-migration-151117-en_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/54TM-ZA7W]; 
and CONCORD AIDWATCH 2017, EU AID UNCOVERED (2017), https://concordeurope.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/CONCORD_AidWatch_Report_2017_web.pdf?1fdb40&amp;1fdb40 
[https://perma.cc/B6ED-QRX7]. 
74. The Principle of Non-refoulement is a founding principle of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, which prohibits a state from expelling or returning a refugee “in any manner 
whatsoever” to the frontiers of territories where his/her life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of her race, religion, ethnicity, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.  
The principle is also embedded in human rights law, which prevents, for instance, the return of 
persons to a place where they would be subject to torture or other cruel or inhuman treatment.  The 
principle is widely considered part of customary international law (see, e.g., U.N. High Comm’r 
for Refugees, The Principle of Non-Refoulement as a Norm of Customary International Law. 
Response to the Questions Posed to UNHCR by the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal 
Republic of Germany in Cases 2, ¶ 3,  BvR 1938/93, 2 BvR 1953/93, 2 BvR 1954/93 (Jan. 31, 
1994), http://www.refworld.org/docid/437b6db64.html [https://perma.cc/NZG9-PYRU]) and thus 
must be respected by all states, regardless of whether they are parties to the relevant conventions.  
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contribute to the support of refugees and host communities through 
financial contributions and technical support.  In all cases, it is of the 
utmost importance that countries make efforts to reunite family members 
who are separated,75 resettle refugees who remain in danger in countries 
of first asylum, and are willing to take responsibility for the rapid 
evacuation of individuals who are in immediate danger.  The RSM is not 
designed to require refugee relocation or resettlement (this is a decision 
to be made ultimately by refugees themselves), but is instead designed so 
that countries can determine how to ensure the availability of safe passage 
consistent with their 10% commitment, if this is needed or desired by a 
refugee. 
Finally, countries should not view fulfilling the responsibility to 
physically protect refugees as a burden.  A variety of studies demonstrate 
that refugees bring much needed economic stimulus to economies and 
skill-sets that are often of great use.76  For example, Saudi Arabia is not 
 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 
137. 
75. The right to protection of family life is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Article 16(3) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 17 and 
23(1), as well as in a number of regional human rights instruments and in the domestic laws of 
many nations.  In the Human Rights Committee, 39th Session, 1990, General Comment 19 on 
Article 23, paragraph 5, the Committee noted that if the members of a family did not have a right 
to live together, there would be no family to protect.  This was upheld in practice in, for example, 
the case of Hendrick Winata, et al.  v. Australia, Jurisprudence U.N. Human Rights Committee, 
No. 930/2000, CCPR/C/72/D/930/2000 (Aug. 16, 2001), where the Human Rights Committee 
found that deporting the parents of an adolescent Australian resident would have been in violation 
of the international law guarantees providing for family life.  The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, article 10(1) states: “The widest possible protection 
and assistance should be accorded to the family . . . .”  The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, 1981, article 18(2), states: “The State shall have the duty to assist the family . . . .”  See also 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, 5th preambular paragraph.  See, e.g., G.A. Res 
217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 183 plen. mtg. at 74 (Dec. 10, 1948); 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Hein’s No. KAV 7285 (Feb. 16, 1995); Comm. on 
Protection of the Family, the Right to Marriage and Equality of the Spouse, H.R.C. on its Thirty-
Ninth Sess. (July 27, 1990); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 26363, 1520 U.N.T.S. 
217, 249 (June 27, 1981); Int’l Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 14668, 999 U.N.T.S 171, 
179 (Dec. 19, 1966); Int’l Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 14531, 993 U.N.T.S. 
3, 7 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
76. These economic improvements can be attributed to increased trade, economic activity, 
and the availability of aid money.  There are also cases reported where the influx of a large group 
of refugees leads to rising prices, competition over scarce jobs, and wage depression.  See CRAIG 
LOSCHMANN ET AL., CONSIDERING THE BENEFITS OF HOSTING REFUGEES: EVIDENCE OF 
REFUGEE CAMPS INFLUENCE LABOR MARKET ACTIVITY AND ECONOMIC WELFARE IN RWANDA 
(draft version Aug. 2017), https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/LOSCHMANN%20et% 
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a signatory to the Refugee Convention nor the 1967 Protocol, and more 
than two million refugees live in the country without recognition or 
rights.77  Even without being a signatory, however, Saudi Arabia made 
commitments in the New York Declaration to share responsibility for 
refugee protection and support.78  Even without a resettlement program, 
it could do this by setting aside labor and family-based visas for at least 
10% of the refugees for whom it has responsibility according to the RSM, 
about 20,000 refugees.  For Saudi Arabia, a country with millions of 
migrant workers, this is neither unreasonable nor unattainable.  It is a 
matter of exercising positive political will. 
1. The Performance of the BRICS Countries Could Be Better 
The BRICS countries are Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa.  They are emerging economic powers and are leading a shift in 
global power away from the developed G7 economies and toward the 
developing world.  In light of their growing social, political, and 
economic power on the world stage, the BRICS countries have the 
opportunity to exercise a much greater role in responsibility sharing 
consistent with their capacities, and could be doing so.  Currently, only 
South Africa is demonstrating this kind of leadership.79 
 
20al_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/GC5U-XP5G].  A study on the impact of Congolese refugees in 
Uganda found evidence of a small economic gain and increased consumption for locals living in 
areas with high numbers of refugees. 
77. In 2015, officials from the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs were cited as stating that 
the country had issued residency permits to 100,000 Syrians, although the kingdom had “made a 
point not to deal with them as refugees.”  Saudi Arabia Says Criticism of Syria Refugee Response 
‘False and Misleading’, GUARDIAN (Sept. 11, 2015, 10:15 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2015/sep/12/saudi-arabia-says-reports-of-its-syrian-refugee-response-false-and-misleading 
[https://perma.cc/Z79X-QNL7].  In a statement submitted to the UNHCR Thematic Discussion One 
on the Global Compact on Refugees, on July 10, 2017, Saudi Arabia stated that it had hosted 
roughly 2.5 million Syrians since the beginning of the crisis, and “has considered as visitors the 
Yemeni brothers who sought refuge in Saudi Arabia.”  Pillars of the Kingdom Humanitarian 
Assistance and Efforts to Supporting Refugees, UNHCR (July 10, 2017), https://www.unhcr.org/ 
events/conferences/5968bff37/statement-saudi-arabia-first-thematic-discussion-10-july-2017.html 
(statement of the Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia).  
78. In the same statement, Saudi Arabia stated that it “will spare no effort to continue to 
work with international organizations and States that believe that collective effort is the best way 
to achieve international peace and security as well as the welfare of humanity.  The Kingdom is 
continuing to play its humanitarian, political and economic role with a sense of responsibility, 
moderation and fairness . . . .” Id.  
79. Pedro Morazán et al., Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union (European 
Parliament), The Role of BRICS in the Developing World (April 2012) (EUR.), https://www.ab. 
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TABLE 6: CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE BRICS COUNTRIES 










































Fed. 1.92% 489,536  232,029  257,507  47% 2,000,000  7.8  
India 3.03% 770,864  207,070  563,794  27% 1,264,788  2.2  
China 12.19% 3,101,168  317,923  2,783,245  10% 3,117,942  1.1  
Brazil 2.13% 541,574  45,153  496,421  8% 2,394,778  4.8  
II.    A PROPOSAL TOWARDS A GLOBAL PLATFORM ON PROTECTION, 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, AND DURABLE SOLUTIONS 
A. Why a New Global Platform? 
It is not inevitable that neighboring states should bear the bulk of the 
responsibility for hosting refugees for long periods of time.  The Global 
Compact on Refugees needs to address the gap between the rights laid 
out in the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and the New 
York Declaration and the reality that there are no defined operational 
mechanisms for realizing these rights.   
The following proposal for discussion is put forward to support efforts 
toward envisioning the Global Compact on Refugees as a New Way of 




80. The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) identified the need for a “New Way of 
Working” (NWoW) that meets people’s needs during a humanitarian crisis but also reduces their 
vulnerability.  The NWoW was included in the WHS Commitment to Action and was signed by 
the U.N. Secretary-General and the Principals of UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO, OCHA, WFP, FAO, 
UNFPA, and UNDP and endorsed by the World Bank and the International Organization for 
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new global platform that brings together a variety of diverse stakeholders 
in a shared vision.  NWoWs are envisioned as being multi-stakeholder 
processes by design and not “owned” by any one entity. 
The scope of work envisioned by the New York Declaration and to be 
covered by the Global Compact on Refugees requires more than either 
UNHCR or UNRWA has the authority or capacity to deliver, but this 
does not diminish the mandate of these agencies as the primary protectors 
of refugees.  Rather, it should bolster their ability to protect refugees and 
support host communities in the short, medium, and long terms. 
It would be self-defeating for the proposed Global Platform to 
duplicate existing efforts, instead, it should promote collaboration by 
bringing together many different U.N. agencies which frequently work 
alongside each other though not with each other, and IFIs and private 
sector actors who are taking on increasing responsibility for support 
related to forced displacement but who do not have formal roles in U.N. 
structures.  While the Refugee Compact envisions “Support 
Platforms,”81 the ad hoc and temporary nature does not provide enough 
opportunity for states and agencies to grapple with difficult policy and 
operational challenges, and forecloses the possibility of joint learning, 
negotiating, and pledging for emerging crises.  An established Global 
Platform would support these opportunities, and could also formalize and 
centralize a Refugee Major Group.82  For many years, U.N. agencies, 
NGOs, and governments have paid lip service to refugee voice and 
representation.  The integration of refugee leadership, and particularly the 
 
Migration.  Working to achieve “collective outcomes” is a central concept of the NWoW.  The 
initiative is not about reallocating funding from one to sector to another but about driving 
humanitarian and development actors not only to work better together, but to design their 
cooperation toward specific goals that reduce the needs, risks, and vulnerabilities of people affected 
by crises.  The NWoW calls on actors to invest in outcomes, rather than fragmented projects and 
activities.  U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, NEW WAY OF 
WORKING 4-6 (2017), https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/NWOW%20Booklet%20low% 
20res.002_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/FKA5-M8AQ]. 
81. Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Global Compact on Refugees, 73 U.N. 
G.A.O.R. Supp. No. 12, ¶ 22-27, U.N. Doc. A/73/12 (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/ 
gcr/GCR_English.pdf [https://perma.cc/94AE-39CY]. 
82. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, UNITED NATIONS 
CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT, AGENDA 21, at 23.1-32.14 (1992), 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4A2-
NBEX] (Section III, “Strengthening the Role of Major Groups”). 
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leadership of refugee women, within this new global platform could 
represent a significant step toward turning that rhetoric into reality. 
FIGURE 5: STRUCTURE OF THE PROPOSED GLOBAL PLATFORM ON 
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B. Structure of the Global Platform 
This paper proposes that the Global Platform on Protection, Human 
Development and Durable Solutions would best be realized if it were led 
by U.N. Member States and not limited by the mandates or structures of 
any one U.N. entity.  It also suggests that it be co-led by two countries, 
one of which is already exceeding its fair share of responsibility for 
refugees, while the other is already at 75% of its fair share and actively 
working to bridge the gap.   
This makes sense because the proposed platform is designed to 
promote and support better performance by individual countries.  By 
having as one co-chair a country that is at or over its fair share, it is 
immediately apparent that meeting fair shares is wholly possible, while 
that particular country obviously has expertise in the challenges and 
needs faced by others in similar situations.  Having the platform co-
chaired by a second country that is actively working to achieve its full 
fair share of responsibility creates space for discussions about 
transforming good intentions into reality, often in the context of  political, 
economic, or social challenges.  Highlighting these challenges and 
exploring ways to facilitate positive outcomes could be useful both in the 
leadership of the proposed Global Platform and as an example for other 
members. 
Membership of the Secretariat could require a plan of action that would 
position each country to meet its fair share of refugee protection and 
support within a set number of years.  Alternatively, if a country was 
already technically meeting its fair share but had laws, policies, or 
practices that undermined the rights of refugees at its borders, in 
protection, or in humanitarian and development programming, this paper 
suggests that it be required to submit a plan for reforming such laws or 
enacting new rights that promote the protection of refugees and their right 
to assistance.  An Office of Monitoring, Oversight, and Accountability 
could be placed within the Secretariat as a support system, both 
identifying areas where states could improve their policies and practices 
and issuing reports on the progress of different states toward meeting 
their fair share of responsibility for refugees. 
Political and infrastructural challenges that prevent the extension of 
education, healthcare services, adequate housing, and livelihood 
opportunities, among others, could be reviewed jointly by humanitarian 
and development actors, as well as by already existing or new regional 
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responsibility sharing groups, which could be empowered to negotiate 
regional approaches.  Recently, countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean have entered into an agreement of exactly this type so that they 
could better share and manage the increased movement of refugees in the 
region.83  This new agreement grew out of discussions and partnerships 
between UNHCR and individual countries, and while it does not include 
the full weight of the World Bank, the private sector, or other key 
stakeholders, it could play a critical role, particularly in countering 
obstacles to refugee rights and meeting the needs of host communities. 
As another example, domestic law, policy, and/or practice that 
prevents the movement of refugees, outsources responsibilities for 
asylum, or results in arbitrary detentions and/or deportations could be 
brought to the attention of the platform by affected countries, refugees 
and their families, civil society, or other stakeholders.  While the Global 
Platform would not have the authority to call for the eradication of 
practices that block refugees’ rights and undermine international 
cooperation around migration and displacement, it could be designed 
with the authority to assess practices and propose better approaches that 
address the concerns of states, promote the rights of refugees, and reduce 
negative impacts on refugees and neighboring states. 
1. Refugee Major Group 
In consultation with refugee groups and refugee advocacy 
organizations, the establishment of a Refugee Major Group is proposed, 
which would be an independent and formally recognized body within the 
Global Platform.  This model is based on the organizing of core 
stakeholders, or “major groups,” which emerged out of the Earth Summit 
in 1992 and has since been replicated in significant processes, including 
the SDGs.84  Like the other major groups, the proposed Refugee Major 
 
83. The Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solutions Framework (MIRPS is the 
acronym in Spanish) is a new framework supported by UNHCR and designed to address the  
full scope of forced displacement from its root causes, strengthening asylum and protection  
systems, and working on durable solutions.  UNHCR, COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL PROTECTION 
AND SOLUTIONS FRAMEWORK (2018), https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/58749 
[https://perma.cc/S4YD-YW28]. 
84. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, UNITED NATIONS 
CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT, AGENDA 21, at 23.1-32.14 (1992), 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4A2-
NBEX] (Section III, “Strengthening the Role of Major Groups”). 
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Group would be empowered to engage directly with states and U.N. 
processes to ensure that refugee-led organizations have an authentic voice 
and meaningful participation, along with a formal opportunity both to 
provide input and shape how responsibility sharing and refugee rights are 
made operational and implemented in different national, regional, and 
global contexts. 
2. Working Groups 
Finally, three working groups are proposed that represent an attempt to 
address challenging policy and operational issues through all parts of the 
displacement cycle: emergency protection concerns, human development 
in displacement, and the development of durable solutions.  Achieving 
any of these often requires extensive multilateral efforts, and good 
practices can be eroded quickly by political, economic, social, and 
security concerns.  
The international community needs a refugee system that is resilient 
and flexible as, at some point, somewhere, politicians and elected leaders 
will stoke nativist and xenophobic impulses when it is politically 
expedient for them to do so.  The proposed Global Platform, independent 
of any one government and made up of a broad range of actors, including 
refugees and host communities, will be insulated from these time-bound 
and geographically shifting dynamics, and will be able to act credibly, 
coherently, and with due regard for the rights and needs of refugees and 
host communities.  The authors propose that a stable and independent 
space is urgently needed to sustain protection as a priority, regardless of 
political, economic, and social contexts. 
Each of the working groups proposed includes gender equality as a 
primary function.  The experiences of women and girls are regularly 
overlooked, but they should be considered, designed for, and integrated 
into all phases of displacement and return—across emergency, 
humanitarian and development phases.  For example, due to traditional 
gender roles in their home countries, female refugees often have less 
formal education and weaker language skills than their male counterparts, 
which poses barriers to finding employment and accessing services, 
including legal advice, in a new country where they do not speak the 
language.  
Family responsibilities, social isolation, and lack of resources can 
make accessing and utilizing healthcare services particularly challenging 
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for refugee women.  Yet as the primary care-givers in the household and 
because of pregnancy and childbirth, women often have greater need than 
men of regular and reliable access to health services.  Additionally, in 
terms of personal and professional development, the lack of affordable 
childcare is a major barrier for refugee women seeking to participate in 
language or skills training.  Yet without these skills, they are unable to 
access employment and earn an income, which leads to a vicious cycle of 
poverty. 
Furthermore, adjusting to a new culture brings about changes in roles 
and family dynamics, which can strain relationships and make women 
more vulnerable to domestic violence.  The Global Platform proposed is 
designed to highlight the need for debate and to ultimately agree to 
concrete and funded programs that counter these challenges, among 
others.  Indeed, no global, regional, or national refugee policy will 
succeed if the experiences and rights of those on the move, and 
particularly women, are not put at its center.  In their absence, new 
approaches may reinforce inequality and vulnerability. 
Again, the proposal for a global platform is one approach put forward 
to move states, international agencies, and organizations beyond talking 
about the challenges inherent in working collaboratively to actually 
debating what kind of structure is needed to make it happen.  This is the 
right moment for such an initiative. 
III.    REFUGEE VOICES AND CHOICES: ENVISIONING THEIR OWN FUTURES 
A. Refugee Voices and Refugee Inclusion 
For all the talk and intentions around increasing the agency and self-
reliance of refugees and of including their perspectives and capacities in 
the design and implementation of programs and policies addressing their 
needs, they are consistently excluded from the corridors of power. 
In the process of preparing this paper, the authors engaged directly with 
refugees, refugee-led organizations, and refugee rights organizations 
around the world in a variety of ways including interviews, shared drafts 
for comment, and an in-person workshop held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
While these are good initial steps, they are not sufficient to ensure that 
the experiences and choices of refugees in different parts of the world, 
with different abilities and ages, levels of education, gender and 
experiences of persecution and conflict, are adequately represented in the 
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proposed model.  Refugees and refugee-led organizations should be 
included in discussion and debate as countries review, discuss, and debate 
these proposals and others. 
Most important is the meaningful integration of refugee women in the 
design and development of any support platform.  Forced migration is 
gendered right from the start.  Conflict and persecution are exacerbated 
by how gender interacts with poverty, violence, exploitation, climate 
change—and power.  Refugee women are often subject to discrimination 
and violence as women, but also as refugees, and due to other elements 
of their identities, whether race, ethnicity, real or perceived sexual 
orientation, age, or disability.  Together, these factors can constrain the 
ability of women to take decisions and to be able to act in their own best 
interests. 
Perhaps just as dangerously, these factors can create a perception that 
women do not have the ability, agency, or authority to take decisions and 
actions to improve their own situations—relegating them to a passive role 
as victims and excluding them from participation in the creation of law, 
policy, and practice approaches.  Women should be at the center of such 
discussions. 
The capacity of women, and their families and communities, to cope 
with and to escape cycles of displacement hinges on women’s ability to 
gain full access to their rights: including education, decent work, 
healthcare, and sexual and reproductive rights.  
Much greater efforts should be made to more clearly understand the 
socio-economic characteristics and backgrounds of female refugees in 
terms of education, skills, work experience, the ordeals they have been 
through, and what they need and want for the future.  Representation 
mechanisms for refugees and host communities are often lacking, and 
therefore people are often not involved in the design and implementation 
of programs and policies that affect them. 
The Global Platform proposed would specifically include women’s 
rights organizations, refugee-led organizations, and local leadership in 
the Refugee Major Group.  While this is not enough to ensure that the 
whole diversity of experience and identity are sufficiently represented, 
we would recommend that the Refugee Major Group have the same 
access to decision making as governments and other institutions, to be 
developed alongside the platform’s broader stakeholder committee.  
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Organizations led by refugee women should be prioritized as this Refugee 
Major Group is developed. 
B. Refugee Choices and Refugee Rights 
In an ideal world, the wishes of all refugees in terms of residence 
during exile would be respected and realized.  The current reality is that 
human rights and refugee law do not make the fulfilment of the refugees’ 
choices of residence mandatory.  Whenever possible, however, refugees’ 
preferences for resettlement and relocation should be respected.  Policies 
and practices aimed at reuniting families should be a priority.  And a 
refugee’s desire to be resettled in a specific country or region, regardless 
of pre-existing links, should be a core consideration in determining their 
destination, when needed.  Refugees and their families are best equipped 
to determine where they are most likely to succeed in exile.  This may 
take into account family links, language, and cultural similarities, or it 
may be based on an entirely different and personal analysis.  It is vital 
that refugees can exercise their own best judgments. 
IV.    WHAT NEXT? 
There is no “one size fits all” approach to delivering the right policy 
framework and program interventions for every conflict and crisis across 
the world.  Each state and region has its own complex mix of social, 
economic, and political challenges—ranging from fragility to 
demographic challenges, from ethnic tensions and internal conflicts to 
weak economies, corruption, and a lack of accountable state structures.  
While this reality presents complex challenges, each person has 
fundamental rights that do not change depending on when and how they 
move, and these rights must be promoted and protected.  The Global 
Compact on Refugees is an unprecedented opportunity to finally meet 
this challenge.  To do so, countries will need to agree on an equitable and 
predictable mechanism for sharing responsibility and a new and 
independent body dedicated to supporting countries in the delivery of 
these responsibilities.  While the Refugee Compact has been adopted, the 
work of realizing its promises are only beginning, and the authors 
encourage countries to robustly discuss and debate these proposals 
among others, and develop workable approaches to refugee protection 
and care.  This is a shared effort.  Let us begin in haste. 
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ANNEX 1: DETAILED METHODOLOGY 
OF THE RESPONSIBILITY SHARING MODEL 
SHORT SUMMARY 
The authors designed a Responsibility Sharing Model (RSM) which 
assigns a percentage of total responsibility for refugee protection to each 
country in the full list of U.N. Member States (193 countries).  This 
approach takes the gross domestic product (GDP) and population of each 
nation as the primary measures of that state’s ability to receive, protect, 
and assist refugees and host communities, and to contribute funding to 
the reception and care of refugees regardless of their location. 
The model can then be utilized to convert the percentage of 
responsibility into a number of total refugees that each country should 
accept or, alternatively, should provide funding for other countries to 
accept and support those refugees.  The authors explored whether a base 
“cost” could be assigned to a refugee anywhere in the world, but 
ultimately concluded that this was not a sound approach, for two reasons.  
First, given the significant differences in economic, social, and political 
contexts of nations around the world, the “cost” of hosting a refugee 
cannot be fixed as a monetary unit.  More importantly, the authors believe 
that every nation has the obligation both to receive refugees who are in 
need of protection and to support the ability of other states to receive, 
protect, and support refugees regardless of their location.  With a fixed 
“cost” assigned to each refugee, some nations might agree only to 
meeting their fair share by providing financial support, thereby shifting 
part of their responsibility by “buying” it out and making refugee 
protection a transactional event.  This raises ethical concerns, may 
reinforce xenophobic tendencies among some elected officials and 
members of the public, and may also be legally suspect. 
The model attempts to combine hard numbers (e.g. GDP and 
population) and to modify these, based on the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), through further development indexes, specifically the 
Human Development Index and the Fragile States Index. 
This section describes in detail the principles behind the RSM, the 
methodology used to construct it, and the many data sources that have 
been considered in the process. 
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MODEL CONSTRUCTION 
Goal 
The goal of the RSM is to create a transparent, equitable, and 
predictable model that assigns a percentage of total responsibility for 
accepting the world’s refugee population, both current and future, or for 
providing, in combination, adequate funding to support other countries to 
accept and protect the funding country’s quota of refugees.  The result is 
a percentage value assigned to each country (the sum of which values 
represents 100% of the total refugee population), and which can be 
converted to a number of total refugees assigned to that country.  
Participating Countries and Components  
The RSM was constructed first by taking the full list of 193 U.N. 
member states.  Hard components incorporated into the model were: 
GDP (Current U.S. $)  
Official definition: GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes 
and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products.  It is 
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.  Data are in 
current U.S. dollars.  Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic 
currencies using single-year official exchange rates.  For a few countries 
where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively 
applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion 
factor is used. 
Source: World Bank National Accounts Data (2016)85 
Population  
Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, 
which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship. 
Source: World Bank National Accounts Data (2016)86 
The model identified GDP and population as the starting point for our 
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analysis.  The use of GDP places emphasis on national wealth, so that the 
richer the country, the larger its fair share of responsibility.  In the case 
of population, it is implied that the larger the population, the less impact 
arriving refugees would have on current social, economic, and political 
dynamics (the per capita concept).  This has been the primary starting 
point in most discussions of responsibility sharing models.87  But while 
the authors used this as a starting point for the model, we did not assume 
this was the only way to approach fair share, and explored a variety of 
different approaches before settling on the approach put forward in this 
paper.  After exploring a variety of different ratios, the authors settled on 
a 75% weight on GDP and a 25% weight on population.  This baseline 
number was then multiplied by key context-specific dynamics that work 
together to assess the capacity of states (as discussed below).   
Development Indexes Applied 
Because the authors believed it was important to account for nations’ 
efforts toward progress on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
in determining a fair share for each country, it explored how to take into 
account access to education, healthcare, inequality, density, gender 
equality, and wealth.  These data points enhance the methodology.   
In 2015, nations adopted the 2030 Agenda, which includes seventeen 
SDGs that would “leave no one behind” by ending extreme poverty and 
prioritizing policies and investments that have long-term, transformative 
impacts on communities and nations.  Exceptional efforts are under way 
across communities, nationally, and internationally for the achievement 
of the SDGs by 2030.  It makes sense that a mechanism for refugee 
responsibility sharing would both consider and be inclusive of these 
goals. 
Indeed, the arrival of tens of thousands of refugees can create stresses 
on already overloaded public utilities and institutions, including water 
 
87. However, such models have not gone without criticism.  For example, the EU’s 
emergency relocation mechanism, set up in 2015 for a two-year period, included a distribution key 
based on size of population, GDP, number of spontaneous asylum applications, and employment 
rate.  Yet the mechanism failed to reach its intended goals of responsibility sharing, as the vast 
majority of member states did not fill their allocated quota.  Further, strict eligibility criteria and 
lack of political will to engage in a meaningful process resulted in asylum seekers being stranded 
in Greece for months on end in substandard conditions.  See OXFAM ET AL., MORE THAN SIX 
MONTHS STRANDED—WHAT NOW? A JOINT POLICY BRIEF ON THE SITUATION FOR DISPLACED 
PERSONS IN GREECE 10 (2016), https://oxf.am/2szF6yJ [https://perma.cc/FAC8-U8PG]. 
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and sanitation, housing, and education.  This in turn may create greater 
challenges for the development of national action plans consistent with 
the SDGs and may diminish the ability of host communities and refugees 
benefiting from these advances.  Second, every refugee has the right to 
protection, education, healthcare, and livelihood opportunities, among 
other rights, and so a fair share mechanism should include an assessment 
of the state’s ability to fulfill these rights, including the exercise of 
women’s and girl’s rights equal to those of men and boys.  
The authors studied a variety of indexes and measurements (the Oxfam 
Inequality Index, the Gini coefficient, the Gender Inequality Index, and 
density and GDP per capita, among others) and finally settled on the 
Human Development Index because it is: 
• widely legitimized 
• calculates almost all the countries (188 out of 193) 
• measures clear aspects of personal and social development, life 
expectancy (health parameter), expected years of schooling 
(education parameter), and gross national income (GNI) per 
capita in PPP terms (wealth parameter). 
Human Development Index (HDI) 
The HDI is a summary measure of average achievement in key 
dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being 
knowledgeable, and having a decent standard of living.  The HDI is the 
geometric mean of normalized indices for each of these three dimensions. 
The health dimension is assessed by life expectancy at birth, while the 
education dimension is measured by mean years of schooling for adults 
aged twenty-five years and more and expected years of schooling for 
children of school entry age.  The standard of living dimension is 
measured by GNI per capita.  The HDI uses the logarithm of income, to 
reflect the diminishing importance of income with increasing GNI.  The 
scores for the three HDI dimension indices are then aggregated into a 
composite index using a geometric mean. 
Source: United Nations Development Programme (2016)88 
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Fragile States Index 
The authors also explored a variety of ways to account for the 
experiences of refugees, for example by considering global human rights 
surveys, but ultimately decided that fragile states, by definition, are 
already in a state of emergency, and so it would not make sense to add 
the responsibility for supporting refugees to the volatility of their 
situations.   
The rankings in the Fragile States Index89 are based on twelve 
indicators of state vulnerability, grouped by category: social (four), 
economic (two), and political (six).  The scores are obtained via a process 
involving content analysis, quantitative data, and development review.  In 
the content analysis phase, millions of documents from over 100,000 
English-language or translated sources (social media are excluded) are 
scanned and filtered through the Fund for Peace’s Conflict Assessment 
System Tool (CAST), which utilizes specific filters and search 
parameters to sort data linked to indicators, and assigns scores based on 
algorithms.  Following CAST analysis, quantitative data from sources 
such as the United Nations, World Health Organization, Transparency 
International, World Bank, and Freedom House are incorporated, which 
then leads to the final phase of development reviews of each indicator for 
each country. 
Considered together in the index, these twelve indicators are a way of 
assessing a state’s vulnerability to collapse or conflict, ranking states on 
a spectrum of categories labelled “sustainable,” “stable,” “warning,” and 
“alert.”  A state that is fragile has several attributes, and such fragility 
may manifest itself in various ways.  Nevertheless, some of the most 
common attributes of state fragility may include: the loss of physical 
control of territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the 
erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability 
to provide reasonable public services, and the inability to interact with 
other states as a full member of the international community. 
The authors determined that states already at a level of “alert” (90 
points on the index or higher) would not be included in its fair share 
analysis.  That said, we found that thirty-five fragile states are currently 
hosting refugees. 
The authors want to disclose that they did struggle with whether to 
 
89. Data for Peace, FFP (2018), http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/data/. 
55
Reynolds and Vacatello: Responsibility Sharing Model for the Global Compact on Refugees
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
380 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 21:325 
include the Fragile States Index as it has been the subject of fair and 
vigorous criticism on a number of fronts, including: (1) that the Index 
suffers from a Eurocentric bias favorably weighting democracies in the 
global north, despite their poor performance on many fronts including 
xenophobia and racism, which is currently even more apparent; and (2) 
an unwillingness to account for, or wrestle with, the fact that many of the 
states deemed most fragile are also states that have been subject to the 
intervention of wealthier nations, including Iraq, Syria, and Libya. 
Nonetheless, the authors chose to factor in the Fragile States Index 
because its inclusion demonstrates incontestably that wealthier nations 
have the capacity and can do much more to receive and protect refugees, 
given that most of the countries deemed fragile, or most at risk of 
emergency, are also countries hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees.  
The authors also note that whether included or excluded, the Fragile 
States Index does not materially alter the findings of the RSM, as the 
tables below demonstrate. 
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Top Five Countries Fair Share with Fragility Index 
Fair Share without  
Fragility Index 
United States 27.17% 26.73% 
China 12.19% 11.99% 
Japan 7.24% 7.13% 
Germany 5.37% 5.28% 
United Kingdom 3.85% 3.79% 
Total 55.82% 54.92% 
Weighting and Standardization 
The model takes the full list of data for GDP and population for each 
of the 193 U.N. member countries, and converts it into a percentage of 
the total (% of total GDP in current US$, and % of total population). 
Example: Brazil 
% of world’s GDP:            2.41%  
% of world’s population:   2.80%  
Then a weight of 75% is applied to the GDP percentage value for each 
country, and a weight of 25% to the population percentage value for each 
country.  This results in the model giving a new combined modified 
weighted percentage value for each country, with the total list still adding 
up to 100%. 
% of world’s GDP:            2.41% x 75%  =  1.81% 
% of world’s population:   2.80% x 25%  =  0.70% 
Total                                                          =  2.51% 
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With the goal of modifying this GDP/population percentage value for 
each country to account for progress toward the 2030 Agenda, the authors 
incorporated the HDI into the model by multiplying each country’s 
weighted percentage value by the corresponding HDI percentile ranking, 
which resulted in a new quotient.90 
Brazil’s HDI: 0.754; percentile ranking of HDI = 0.58 (based on full list 
of 188 countries in the HDI) 
Finally, the authors incorporated the Fragile States Index, and in every 
country with more than 90 points (which is considered an ‘alert’ 
condition) multiplied the previous value by zero, eliminating the 
responsibility sharing portions for those countries.  All other nations were 
assigned a multiplier of 1, thus maintaining their previous results.   
Brazil’s RSM: 68.20 → 68.20<90 = multiply by 1 
We then normalized the final values, creating final percentages of 
responsibility sharing for the remaining countries.  Again, applying this 
to Brazil: 
% of world’s GDP:            2.41% x 75%  =  1.81% 
% of world’s population:   2.80% x 25%  =  0.70% 
Total                                                          =  2.51% 
Brazil weighted % value x HDI (percentile ranking) x 1 (<90 FSI)  
2.51 x 0.58 (HDI) x 1 (fragility) = 1.46 
Normalized result (which is completed after all the RSMs are 
determined) = 2.13% 
→ |2.51% 𝑥 0.58 𝑥 1|  =  2.13% 
 
90. Based on the HDI, each nation received a number between 0 to 1, with quotients nearing 
0 connoting that a nation scored poorly on the HDI indicators, and those nearing 1 connoting more 
successful indicators of human development outcomes.  For the five countries that did not have an 
HDI score assigned, the authors applied a value of 0.5. 
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ANNEX 2: FAIR SHARE CALCULATION FOR EACH NATION 
BASED ON THE RSM FINDINGS OF THE 
RESPONSIBILITY SHARING MODEL 
The table below shows the overall global RSM results for each of the 
193 members of the United Nations. 
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Country Fair share normalized 
Bolivia 0.04% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.02% 
Botswana 0.01% 
Brazil 2.13% 
Brunei Darussalam 0.02% 
Bulgaria 0.08% 
Burkina Faso 0.00% 
Burundi 0.00% 










Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.00% 
Congo, Rep. 0.00% 
Costa Rica 0.07% 
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Country Fair share normalized 
Cyprus 0.03% 




Dominican Republic 0.07% 
Ecuador 0.12% 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.39% 
El Salvador 0.03% 
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Korea, Dem. People’s 
Rep. 0.00% 
Korea, Rep. 2.12% 
Kuwait 0.14% 
Kyrgyz Republic 0.01% 
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Country Fair share normalized 
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Country Fair share normalized 
Romania 0.27% 
Russian Fed. 1.92% 
Rwanda 0.00% 
Samoa 0.00% 
San Marino 0.00% 
Sao Tome and Principe 0.00% 




Sierra Leone 0.00% 
Singapore 0.45% 
Slovak Republic 0.12% 
Slovenia 0.07% 
Solomon Islands 0.00% 
Somalia 0.00% 
South Africa 0.27% 
South Sudan 0.00% 
Spain 1.76% 
Sri Lanka 0.14% 
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.00% 
St. Lucia 0.00% 




Reynolds and Vacatello: Responsibility Sharing Model for the Global Compact on Refugees
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
390 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 21:325 

















U. Arab Emirates 0.43% 
Uganda 0.00% 
Ukraine 0.20% 
United Kingdom 3.85% 
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Country Fair share normalized 
Venezuela, RB 0.43% 
Vietnam 0.30% 
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ANNEX 3: APPLICATION OF THE RSM TO DETERMINE 
THE PERFORMANCE OF INDIVIDUAL STATES 
The table below shows the overall application and analysis of the RSM 
to 158 U.N. Member States (excluded are the 35 fragile states, which drop 
out based on the analysis).  The first seventy states listed (Afghanistan 
through Sierra Leone) are states whose performances are over 100% of 
their fair share.  The next ten states listed (Ghana through Benin) are 
between 50% and 100% of their fair share.  The remainder of states are 


























Afghanistan 0.00% -    59,899  (59,899) Fragile 
Angola 0.00% -    45,698  (45,698) Fragile 
Burundi 0.00% -    61,082  (61,082) Fragile 




0.00% -    12,419  (12,419) Fragile 
Chad 0.00% -    393,160  (393,160) Fragile 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 0.00% -    453,283  (453,283) Fragile 
Congo, Rep. 0.00% -    53,132  (53,132) Fragile 
Cote d’Ivoire 0.00% -    1,683  (1,683) Fragile 
Eritrea 0.00% -    2,350  (2,350) Fragile 
Ethiopia 0.00% -    793,595  (793,595) Fragile 
Guinea 0.00% -    5,176  (5,176) Fragile 
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Bissau 0.00% -    9,295  (9,295) Fragile 
Haiti 0.00% -    10  (10) Fragile 
Iraq 0.00% -    273,346  (273,346) Fragile 
Kenya 0.00% -    494,863  (494,863) Fragile 
Korea, Dem. 
People’s Rep. 0.00% -    -    -    Fragile 
Liberia 0.00% -    18,999  (18,999) Fragile 
Libya 0.00% -    38,547  (38,547) Fragile 
Mali 0.00% -    17,801  (17,801) Fragile 
Mauritania 0.00% -    74,735  (74,735) Fragile 
Myanmar 0.00% -    -    -    Fragile 
Nepal 0.00% -    25,321  (25,321) Fragile 
Niger 0.00% -    166,158  (166,158) Fragile 
Nigeria 0.00% -    1,834  (1,834) Fragile 
Pakistan 0.00% -    1,357,416  (1,357,416) Fragile 
Rwanda 0.00% -    320,145  (320,145) Fragile 
Somalia 0.00% -    24,368  (24,368) Fragile 
South Sudan 0.00% -    264,352  (264,352) Fragile 
Sudan 0.00% -    437,518  (437,518) Fragile 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 0.00% -    559,047  (559,047) Fragile 
Timor-Leste 0.00% -    -    -    Fragile 
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Uganda 0.00% -    982,715  (982,715) Fragile 
Yemen, Rep. 0.00% -    278,880  (278,880) Fragile 
Zimbabwe 0.00% -    8,378  (8,378) Fragile 
Jordan 0.06% 14,395  2,897,303  (2,882,908) 20127% 
Djibouti 0.00% 177  25,744  (25,567) 14547% 
Lebanon 0.06% 15,160  1,476,671  (1,461,511) 9740% 
Burkina Faso 0.00% 613  32,676  (32,063) 5330% 
Gambia, The 0.00% 265  7,940  (7,675) 2996% 
Nauru 0.00% 27  757  (730) 2781% 
Tanzania 0.07% 17,892  290,037  (272,145) 1621% 
Turkey 1.03% 261,096  3,115,376  (2,854,280) 1193% 
Malawi 0.01% 2,666  30,415  (27,749) 1141% 
Mozambique 0.01% 1,608  17,651  (16,043) 1098% 
Togo 0.01% 1,396  13,274  (11,878) 951% 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 0.62% 156,841  979,526  (822,685) 625% 
Senegal 0.01% 3,671  17,803  (14,132) 485% 
Belize 0.00% 504  2,431  (1,927) 482% 
South Africa 0.27% 67,885  309,942  (242,057) 457% 
Zambia 0.03% 7,523  32,669  (25,146) 434% 
Armenia 0.02% 4,210  17,968  (13,758) 427% 
Ecuador 0.12% 30,281  127,390  (97,109) 421% 
Bangladesh 0.30% 75,106  276,208  (201,102) 368% 
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Guinea 0.01% 3,091  9,553  (6,462) 309% 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 0.39% 99,365  263,407  (164,042) 265% 
Serbia 0.06% 14,788  36,652  (21,864) 248% 
Malta 0.02% 3,838  8,850  (5,012) 231% 
Bulgaria 0.08% 19,996  33,856  (13,860) 169% 
Sweden 0.74% 189,152  313,267  (124,115) 166% 
Swaziland 0.00% 682  1,113  (431) 163% 
Algeria 0.24% 61,644  99,944  (38,300) 162% 
Cyprus 0.03% 7,281  11,572  (4,291) 159% 
Venezuela, 
RB 0.43% 110,200  172,957  (62,757) 157% 
Namibia 0.01% 2,373  3,432  (1,059) 145% 
Malaysia 0.41% 103,432  148,574  (45,142) 144% 
Panama 0.07% 17,445  21,821  (4,376) 125% 
Austria 0.54% 136,591  169,659  (33,068) 124% 
Greece 0.29% 73,262  86,413  (13,151) 118% 
Sierra Leone 0.00% 606  690  (84) 114% 
Ghana 0.05% 13,735  13,236  499  96% 
Germany 5.37% 1,365,599  1,256,828  108,771  92% 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 0.02% 6,044  5,324  720  88% 
Gabon 0.01% 3,285  2,840  445  86% 
Thailand 0.51% 129,049  111,457  17,592  86% 
Tajikistan 0.02% 4,330  3,160  1,170  73% 
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Montenegro 0.01% 1,749  1,056  693  60% 
Botswana 0.01% 3,646  2,173  1,473  60% 
Albania 0.02% 4,872  2,890  1,982  59% 
Benin 0.01% 2,018  1,023  995  51% 
Russian Fed. 1.92% 489,536  232,029  257,507  47% 
Norway 0.57% 144,023  67,078  76,945  47% 
Switzerland 1.00% 253,735  113,481  140,254  45% 
Costa Rica 0.07% 17,918  7,826  10,092  44% 
France 3.54% 900,752  367,317  533,435  41% 
Belgium 0.66% 167,790  66,279  101,511  40% 
Georgia 0.02% 6,285  2,437  3,848  39% 
Israel 0.46% 117,766  44,623  73,143  38% 
Netherlands 1.17% 296,724  112,155  184,569  38% 
Italy 2.62% 665,341  247,291  418,050  37% 
Denmark 0.46% 117,217  39,846  77,371  34% 
Finland 0.33% 84,322  24,001  60,321  28% 
India 3.03% 770,864  207,070  563,794  27% 
Morocco 0.11% 29,041  6,733  22,308  23% 
Canada 2.28% 580,778  121,267  459,511  21% 
Luxembourg 0.08% 20,845  4,259  16,586  20% 
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FYR 0.01% 3,337  658  2,679  20% 
Ukraine 0.20% 51,051  9,875  41,176  19% 
Hungary 0.18% 45,620  8,161  37,459  18% 
Moldova 0.01% 3,024  517  2,507  17% 
United 
Kingdom 3.85% 979,337  165,779  813,558  17% 
Australia 1.85% 471,289  71,778  399,511  15% 
Nicaragua 0.02% 4,398  665  3,733  15% 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 0.01% 3,733  459  3,274  12% 
United States 27.17% 6,911,438  815,608  6,095,830  12% 
China 12.19% 3,101,168  317,923  2,783,245  10% 
Peru 0.24% 59,872  6,041  53,831  10% 
Azerbaijan 0.06% 15,495  1,423  14,072  9% 
Ireland 0.43% 110,431  10,053  100,378  9% 
Belarus 0.08% 21,468  1,881  19,587  9% 
Lesotho 0.00% 551  48  503  9% 
Poland 0.71% 180,683  15,178  165,505  8% 
Brazil 2.13% 541,574  45,153  496,421  8% 
Bolivia 0.04% 10,028  792  9,236  8% 
Liechtenstein 0.01% 2,345  183  2,162  8% 
Spain 1.76% 446,622  33,349  413,273  7% 
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Lithuania 0.06% 15,739  1,175  14,564  7% 
Dominican 
Republic 0.07% 18,987  1,388  17,599  7% 
Czech 
Republic 0.29% 73,057  4,419  68,638  6% 
Chile 0.36% 91,716  4,960  86,756  5% 
Indonesia 1.06% 269,975  14,405  255,570  5% 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 0.02% 6,271  318  5,953  5% 
Kuwait 0.14% 34,831  1,762  33,069  5% 
Latvia 0.04% 9,859  497  9,362  5% 
Tunisia 0.06% 14,390  682  13,708  5% 
Suriname 0.00% 995  47  948  5% 
Slovenia 0.07% 16,613  781  15,832  5% 
Croatia 0.07% 18,396  861  17,535  5% 
Iceland 0.03% 7,492  340  7,152  5% 
Romania 0.27% 69,549  2,979  66,570  4% 
Estonia 0.03% 8,692  365  8,327  4% 
Uruguay 0.07% 17,051  683  16,368  4% 
Argentina 0.77% 196,599  7,284  189,315  4% 
Bahrain 0.04% 10,313  371  9,942  4% 
Cambodia 0.03% 6,829  243  6,586  4% 
Sri Lanka 0.14% 35,110  1,180  33,930  3% 
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Republic 0.12% 31,700  1,028  30,672  3% 
Oman 0.09% 21,808  683  21,125  3% 
Paraguay 0.03% 7,783  237  7,546  3% 
Portugal 0.27% 69,830  2,052  67,778  3% 
Monaco 0.00% 1,158  32  1,126  3% 
Mexico 1.28% 326,804  8,849  317,955  3% 
New Zealand 0.28% 70,226  1,724  68,502  2% 
Guatemala 0.06% 15,647  302  15,345  2% 
Korea, Rep. 2.12% 540,192  8,668  531,524  2% 
Kazakhstan 0.20% 51,103  790  50,313  2% 
Guyana 0.00% 746  11  735  1% 
U. Arab 
Emirates 0.43% 110,606  1,507  109,099  1% 
Japan 7.24% 1,842,779  21,315  1,821,464  1% 
Bahamas, 
The 0.01% 2,696  31  2,665  1% 
Cuba 0.12% 30,014  343  29,671  1% 
Madagascar 0.02% 5,967  55  5,912  1% 
Fiji 0.01% 1,484  12  1,472  1% 
Colombia 0.33% 82,682  644  82,038  1% 
El Salvador 0.03% 6,964  46  6,918  1% 
Qatar 0.19% 49,133  319  48,814  1% 
Philippines 0.38% 95,813  622  95,191  1% 
Jamaica 0.02% 4,440  24  4,416  1% 
75
Reynolds and Vacatello: Responsibility Sharing Model for the Global Compact on Refugees
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  


























Honduras 0.02% 6,105  26  6,079  0% 
Turkmenistan 0.03% 8,465  27  8,438  0% 
Mongolia 0.02% 4,042  11  4,031  0% 
Uzbekistan 0.11% 28,456  27  28,429  0% 
Saudi Arabia 0.88% 223,704  190  223,514  0% 
Andorra 0.00% 1,092  -    1,092  0% 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 0.00% 450  -    450  0% 
Barbados 0.01% 1,478  -    1,478  0% 
Bhutan 0.00% 554  -    554  0% 
Brunei 
Darussalam 0.02% 4,020  -    4,020  0% 
Cabo Verde 0.00% 461  -    461  0% 
Comoros 0.00% 196  -    196  0% 
Dominica 0.00% 142  -    142  0% 
Equatorial 
Guinea 0.01% 1,551  -    1,551  0% 
Grenada 0.00% 296  -    296  0% 
Kiribati 0.00% 57  -    57  0% 
Lao PDR 0.02% 3,945  -    3,945  0% 
Maldives 0.00% 820  -    820  0% 
Marshall 
Islands 0.00% 67  -    67  0% 
Mauritius 0.02% 4,053  -    4,053  0% 
Micronesia, 
Fed. Sts. 0.00% 82  -    82  0% 
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Palau 0.00% 93  -    93  0% 
Samoa 0.00% 239  -    239  0% 
San Marino 0.00% 375  -    375  0% 
Sao Tome 
and Principe 0.00% 98  -    98  0% 
Seychelles 0.00% 435  -    435  0% 
Singapore 0.45% 114,468  -    114,468  0% 
Solomon 
Islands 0.00% 218  -    218  0% 
St. Kitts and 
Nevis 0.00% 251  -    251  0% 




0.00% 199  -    199  0% 
Tonga 0.00% 130  -    130  0% 
Tuvalu 0.00% 13  -    13  0% 
Vanuatu 0.00% 184  -    184  0% 
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